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Regulating Domestic Intelligence
Collection
Emily Berman*
Abstract
Scholars have long recognized that a Federal Bureau of
Investigation wielding robust domestic intelligence-collection
powers poses a threat to civil liberties. Yet the FBI’s post-9/11
mandate to prevent terrorist attacks (not merely investigate
completed attacks) demands that the agency engage in broad
intelligence-collection activities within the United States—
activities that can threaten fundamental freedoms. This Article
argues that strategies derived from administrative law principles
can help alleviate the tendency of threat-prevention efforts to erode
civil liberties.
The fundamental problem this Article tackles is that the
traditional governance mechanisms we rely upon to protect
individual rights are ineffective in the domestic intelligencecollection realm. This failure of traditional checks stems from,
first, the absence of practical constraints to channel the enormous
discretion that the Justice Department and the FBI enjoy in
determining the scope and nature of the FBI’s domestic
6intelligence-collection activities; second, the lack of judicial or
political checks on these activities, resulting in a deficit of
democratic legitimacy and accountability; and third, the risk that
the FBI’s singular focus on terrorism prevention will overwhelm
rights-protection concerns.
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Workshop and Visiting Assistant Professor Workshop, Amna Akbar, Miriam
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Sarah Light, Mike Livermore, Teddy Rave, Margo Schlanger, Shirin Sinnar,
Mila Sohoni, Nelson Tebbe, and Adam Zimmerman for helpful comments and
discussions, and to the Brennan Center for Justice and Brooklyn Law School for
generous research funding.
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Drawing on principles of administrative law, this Article
explains how regulatory strategies can be employed to improve
governance of domestic intelligence gathering. It recommends
imposing procedural requirements on the exercise of discretion,
facilitating meaningful pluralist input into relevant decision
making processes, and augmenting the attention given to civil
liberties concerns by requiring the Justice Department to prepare
Civil Liberties Impact Statements and by including in the process
an entity whose primary goal is the protection of civil liberties.
These governance reforms will prompt domestic intelligence
regulation to take account of civil liberties while preserving the
ability of law enforcement to pursue security.
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I. Introduction
In the summer of 2013, former National Security Agency
contractor and Central Intelligence Agency employee Edward
Snowden shook the world with revelations of extensive United
States government surveillance activities—including surveillance
of American citizens.1 The revelations sparked a renewed debate
about the proper scope of intelligence collection in a democracy.
What has gone unaddressed in this debate, however, is the vast
investigative powers conferred on America’s domestic
surveillance agency—the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
And unlike the foreign-intelligence programs disclosed by
Snowden’s leaks, some of the FBI’s most powerful domestic
intelligence-collection authorities include neither statutory limits
nor judicial oversight.2
If the FBI determines that an individual’s daily life is
relevant to a terrorism investigation, it can easily draw a detailed
picture of that life.3 With no reason at all for suspicion and no
judicial approval, agents can follow the individual around the
clock to ascertain where he goes. They can ask his neighbors
about their conversations with him, or dispatch an informant to
his house of worship to report on the individual’s religious
1. See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of
Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com
/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order (last visited Nov. 13,
2013) (discussing the NSA’s collection of millions of American’s phone records
from Verizon) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See infra Part II (discussing the nature of intelligence collection).
3. See infra Part II.A (describing sophisticated data-mining tools that
allow the government to “render a detailed dossier on any American”).
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observance. With the minimal process associated with issuing an
administrative subpoena,4 the government can establish a record
of the individual’s movements and social dealings by acquiring
financial and employment records, a list of email addresses with
which he has corresponded, and a list of phone numbers he has
dialed.
These broad investigative powers operate in tension with
fundamental rights. Collecting extensive personal information
about innocent Americans raises concerns about privacy; about
impact on freedoms of expression, association, and religious
practice; and to the extent that such activity is disproportionately
focused on particular communities, it can raise equal protection
concerns as well.5 The challenge, then, is how to mitigate these
civil liberties threats without unduly interfering with the FBI’s
ability to prevent terrorist attacks.
This Article argues that administrative law strategies
suggest several measures that, taken together, would represent a
domestic intelligence governance regime better equipped to
safeguard civil liberties. This argument bridges a gap between
two growing areas of literature. The first, which I label “riskmanagement literature,” advocates taking a regulatory approach
to the threat of terrorism—to treating it not as an enemy to
defeat, but, like environmental or health and safety risks, as a
chronic problem to be assessed and managed.6 The other, the
4. Infra note 63 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part II.A (discussing the FBI’s broad intelligence-collection
powers and the negative impact those powers can have on individual liberties).
6. See Samuel Rascoff, Domesticating Intelligence, 83 U.S.C. L. REV. 575,
582 (2010) (advocating a regulatory approach to domestic intelligence); Eric
Posner, Fear and the Regulatory Model of Counterterrorism, 25 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 681, 696 (2002) (describing the need for regulation in order to reduce
the risk of terrorist attacks); Jessica Stern & Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution
Against Terrorism, 9 J. RISK RESEARCH 393, 413 (2006) (analogizing the push for
antiterrorism legislation to previous movements for more health and
environmental legislation); Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability Neglect,
26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 121, 129–31 (2003) (describing the effect public fear
and probability neglect play in movements for environmental and health
legislation and speculating what that effect should mean for counterterrorism
regulation); James B. Comey, Intelligence Under the Law, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 439,
442–44 (2007) (discussing the importance of adhering to legal institutions, even
in the intelligence community).
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“rights-protection literature,” argues that the current domestic
intelligence-collection governance regime fails to address
effectively the tension with civil liberties created by the FBI’s
contemporary counterterrorism efforts.7 I contend that the riskmanagement literature’s valuable insight that administrative law
can usefully be applied to improve governance in the security
context suggests a means of mitigating the rights-protection
scholars’ concerns.
These rights-protection concerns arise in large part because
traditional means of regulating executive power cannot
effectively protect civil liberties in this area. This failure of
traditional checks results from three characteristics of the regime
regulating domestic intelligence collection. First, it lacks both
doctrinal and practical constraints on the FBI and Justice
Department’s enormous discretion in drafting and implementing
the applicable rules.8 Second, the checks that normally ensure the
accountability and democratic legitimacy of government actions—
judicial review, congressional oversight, and public scrutiny—
simply do not operate effectively in the secretive world of
intelligence collection.9 And third, in its vigorous pursuit of

7. See Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General
and National Security Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1027 (2013)
[hereinafter Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within] (discussing the legislature
and courts’ reluctance to restrict the executive’s power when it infringes on civil
liberties in furtherance of national security); Amna A. Akbar, Policing
“Radicalization”, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (discussing the
government’s monitoring of religious groups in an effort to prevent members of
those groups from turning to violence); Shirin Sinnar, Questioning Law
Enforcement: The First Amendment and Counterterrorism Interviews, 77 BROOK.
L. REV. 41, 42 (2011) [hereinafter Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement]
(discussing the First Amendment concerns raised when law enforcement selects
individuals for questioning based on their speech and associations); Rascoff,
supra note 6, at 586 (stating that the protection of civil liberties should factor
into the review of intelligence gathering actions).
8. See infra Parts II.A & II.B.1 (discussing the lack of judicial and
legislative oversight over intelligence collection and the lack of practical
restraints on the FBI when it prioritizes the collection of data over everything
else).
9. See infra Part II.B.2 (describing the lack of judicial, political, and public
oversight over intelligence collection).
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terrorism prevention, the FBI is not subject to any structural
checks to prevent it from undervaluing rights protection.10
This broad discretion, democracy deficit, and absence of
counterweight to the FBI’s prevention goal means that—despite
the privacy and liberty implications of the FBI’s activities—the
responsibility of striking a balance between security needs and
other important interests is left almost entirely to the Attorney
General and the FBI itself. Restraints on the FBI’s domestic
intelligence-collection activities come from the Attorney General’s
Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (Guidelines)11 and the
Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG).12 The
Guidelines are developed by the Attorney General and set out a
basic framework for the FBI’s operations; the several-hundredpage DIOG, promulgated by the FBI, specifies more detailed
rules for the Guidelines’ implementation.13 The Guidelines were
originally created to forestall impending legislative efforts to
cabin the Bureau’s intelligence-collection powers14 but due to
subsequent changes—particularly post-9/11 changes aimed at
promoting terrorism-prevention efforts—the Guidelines and
DIOG now serve to facilitate rather than limit the Bureau’s
intelligence-collection role.

10. See infra Part II.B.3 (describing the FBI’s primary focus on national
security and intelligence gathering, and the fact that privacy concerns are
viewed as a hurdle to effective policymaking).
11. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS (2008) [hereinafter
GUIDELINES].
12. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC
INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE (2011) [hereinafter DIOG].
13. Id. Initially secret in its entirety, Freedom of Information Act requests
prompted the Justice Department to release the DIOG—with significant
redactions. See Muslim Advocates v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 833 F. Supp. 2d 106,
109 (D.D.C. 2012) (concluding that the release of the DIOG under a FOIA
request was proper, but that the FBI was permitted to redact certain portions of
the DIOG); Elec. Frontier Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 826 F. Supp. 2d 157,
174 (D.D.C. 2011) (directing the Department of Justice to release more detailed
descriptions of the U.S. and European Union’s discussions over the
international exchange of personal information).
14. See infra Part II (discussing the original goal of the Levi Guidelines to
“strictly curtail domestic intelligence investigations”).
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Conceptualizing the threat of terrorism as a regulatory
challenge represents a significant first step toward devising an
improved governance regime for the Guidelines and the DIOG.
But there are additional steps that the existing risk-management
literature has not yet taken. The idea of how administrative law
would apply to intelligence collection remains undertheorized—
an unsurprising state of affairs given the recent emergence of this
line of inquiry. Scholars have not yet tackled the thorny question
of how to truly reap the benefits that the regulatory approach
offers, while simultaneously taking into account the unique
governance challenges presented by the domestic-intelligence
context. Nor has the literature to date sufficiently grappled with
civil liberties concerns.15
This Article seeks to fill these gaps, drawing on
administrative law principles to suggest novel governance
designs custom tailored to address the civil liberties concerns
inherent in domestic intelligence collection. To do so it looks to
areas of administrative law that present similar governance
challenges, identifies how those challenges have been addressed
in the administrative state, and suggests how to adapt those
strategies to function in the intelligence-collection context.16
Each of the governance challenges this Article identifies has
an analog in the administrative state. Take first the scope of
discretion conferred on federal officials. This delegation of
discretionary authority to the Attorney General and the FBI
resembles the broad delegations in statutes establishing
administrative agencies’ powers and responsibilities. Concerns
arising from the scope of these delegations are addressed through
15. A recent proposal to develop a risk-management approach to
intelligence-collection governance by employing traditional agency oversight
tools—centralized cost−benefit analysis, judicial review, and pluralist input into
decision making, see Rascoff, supra note 6, at 633–47 (outlining a plan for
regulatory governance of intelligence gathering agencies)—fails to incorporate
effective civil liberties protections. See infra Part IV.A (discussing reform
proposals that focus on improving the FBI’s ability to correctly assess the risks
and account for the psychological costs of terrorism, while not addressing the
civil liberties concerns the Guidelines implicate).
16. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the fact that the Guidelines and DIOG
place civil liberties in a secondary role to the FBI’s intelligence gathering
mission).
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the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA)17 procedural
requirements.18 Second, the absence of judicial, legislative, or
public involvement in the design and implementation of the
Guidelines is reminiscent of the democracy deficit inherent in the
promulgation of regulations by technical experts so often at the
heart of debates over the legitimacy of the administrative state.
The administrative state has responded to this deficit by
developing mechanisms to increase the participatory nature of
administrative activity.19 And third, the risk that the Guidelines
privilege the FBI’s primary mission—the prevention of terrorism
and protection of national security—over concerns for
fundamental rights mirrors the many circumstances where
agencies are charged simultaneously with multiple, competing
goals. A menu of regulatory tools has been developed to reconcile
competing agency missions.20 Looking to the lessons that can be
gleaned from these administrative governance strategies provides
a useful roadmap for filling the intelligence-collection governance
gap in a way that also protects civil liberties.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part II first argues that
the expansive scope of investigative authority that the current
Attorney General’s Guidelines and the FBI’s implementing
procedures confer on the Bureau exist in tension with the
protection of civil liberties. It then contends that the lack of
practical, traditional judicial or political, and structural checks to
impose effective oversight on domestic intelligence gathering
necessitates the implementation of alternative governance
mechanisms.
In Part III, the Article harnesses administrative law
strategies to suggest regulatory tools custom tailored to yield
17. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L. No. 79–404, 60 Stat. 237
(1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 500–706 (2012)).
18. See infra Part III.A (describing the improvements that could be made
by implementing administrative law strategies in the intelligence-collection
context).
19. See infra Part III (describing the broad opportunities for participation
in administrative rulemaking, and the democratic legitimacy that
approximating such participation could create in the intelligence-collection
realm).
20. See infra Part III.D (describing the methods that administrative
governance uses to reconcile and balance competing policy goals).
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regulatory benefits that protect fundamental rights in the context
of the FBI’s Guidelines regime. To do so, it first explores the
underlying
purposes
and
justifications
of
traditional
administrative law tools that are used to address governance
challenges conceptually similar to those that the Guidelines
regime presents.21 It then suggests specific reforms designed to
achieve the same ends as those traditional tools in the
intelligence-collection context.22 First, the Attorney General’s
discretion in the development and implementation of the
Guidelines should be subject to a reason-giving requirement.
Specific procedural limitations should require that the Attorney
General or FBI Director provide both notice of a decision to
amend the Guidelines or the DIOG and written justifications for
their ultimate decisions. Second, to enable meaningful pluralist
input into the process, the FBI must go beyond the cursory
meetings with interested stakeholders that it has relied upon to
date. Instead, a variety of entities inside the government should
be empowered to participate in the amendment process. Third, to
balance the government’s interest in security with privacy and
liberty concerns, (1) any changes to the Guidelines regime should
be accompanied by a “Civil Liberties Impact Statement” prepared
by the Justice Department, and (2) stakeholders whose primary
goal is the protection of liberties—rather than the pursuit of
security—should be involved in the process of drafting or
modifying the Guidelines and their implementing regulations.23
This approach will impose a meaningful governance regime
crafted for domestic intelligence gathering that mitigates
concerns about the impact on civil liberties without sacrificing
security.
Part IV addresses some possible sources of skepticism for
this proposal. It first explains why reliance on existing
administrative law tools—even if those tools are partially
modified to operate in the intelligence-collection realm—will be
21. See infra Part III.C.1 (describing the administrative state’s response to
the inherent democracy deficit present in administrative actions).
22. See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing methods that could be used to
introduce administrative procedures into intelligence collection).
23. See infra Part III.D.2 (proposing solutions which would allow the FBI to
balance competing intelligence collection and civil liberties interests).
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insufficient to protect civil liberties.24 It then responds to
questions about how to enforce these reforms in the absence of
judicial review, suggesting alternative compliance mechanisms.25
II. The FBI’s Domestic Intelligence-Collection Powers
Since the FBI’s inception, there has been tension embedded
in its mission. It is charged not only with solving crimes but also
with preventing them.26 While the two goals often complement
one another, they call for very different types of investigative
activities. Focus on crime solving argues for a set of investigative
powers enabling inquiries into specific acts, with an eye toward
successful prosecution of the perpetrators.27 Preventive work, by
contrast, requires the collection of much broader swaths of
information—information about illicit organizations, their
members, their goals, their capacities, and their sources of
funding as well as information about possible targets.28
Over time, both the Bureau’s focus and the rules governing
its activities have swung back and forth along the spectrum
between the targeted investigations of crime solving and the
broader intelligence gathering associated with prevention. The
Guidelines themselves are the product of the FBI’s early-1970s
move away from intelligence collection. After the United States
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities, commonly known as the
Church Committee for its chair Senator Frank Church (D-ID),
24. See infra Part IV.A (describing the inadequacies of administrative law
tools alone).
25. See infra Part IV.B (addressing the fact that by its nature intelligence
collection cannot be as transparent as traditional administrative procedures,
and suggesting alternative compliance methods which can still alleviate some of
the governance concerns implicated by intelligence collection).
26. See infra Part II.A (discussing the nature of the FBI).
27. See DIOG, supra note 12, Preamble (discussing broadly the
investigative role of the FBI).
28. See Laura K. Donohue, Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance, 96 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1059, 1139–40 (2006) (discussing the hundreds of data
mining operations being carried out by the United States government in order to
prevent terrorist attacks).
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revealed that decades of unregulated intelligence collection by the
FBI had resulted in widespread abuses of the government’s
investigative powers,29 Congress determined that the FBI should
be subject to a legislative charter setting out strict limits on its
intelligence-collection authority.30 In an effort to stave off
potentially more restrictive legislative action, President Gerald
Ford’s Attorney General, Edward Levi, issued in 1976 the first
set of Attorney General’s Guidelines—known as the Levi
Guidelines.31
The Levi Guidelines strictly curtailed domestic intelligence
investigations through a basic regulatory structure that
subsequent versions of the Guidelines have largely retained.32
29. The Church Committee exposed a litany of intelligence-collection
programs (most implemented under infamous long-time FBI Director J. Edgar
Hoover) in which the FBI used widespread surveillance to harass and discredit
law-abiding—though often antiwar or civil rights—groups and individuals based
on their political beliefs. See SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS OF
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: BOOK III: FINAL REPORT
OF THE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, S. REP NO. 94-755, at 27 (1976) [hereinafter CHURCH
COMM. REPORT] (detailing the Committee’s findings).
30. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S COMPLIANCE WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINES 35 (2005) [hereinafter AGG COMPLIANCE REPORT]
(discussing these limits). Other reforms prompted by the Church Committee
include Exec. Order No. 11,905, 41 Fed. Reg. 7703 (Feb. 18, 1976) (banning
assassinations) and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA),
Pub. L. No. 95–511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885(c) (2012))
(imposing limits on electronic foreign-intelligence surveillance).
31. The Guidelines, officially entitled Domestic Security Investigation
Guidelines, “were intended . . . to diminish the perceived need for legislation to
regulate and restrict” FBI activity. United States v. Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d
141, 190–91 (D. Mass. 1999); see also EDWARD LEVI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS (Nov. 4, 1976)
reprinted in FBI Statutory Charter: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong. 18–26 (2d Sess. 1978) (describing the Guidelines as
“intended . . . to diminish the perceived need for legislation to regulate and
restrict” FBI activity); FBI Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 307
(1976) (discussing a possible statutory charter for the FBI).
32. See EMILY BERMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE: NEW POWERS, NEW RISKS 11 (2011),) http://www.brennan
center.org/sites/default/files/legacy/AGGReportFINALed.pdf (discussing the fact
that the “basic structure” from the Levi Guidelines “has been retained in all
subsequent versions of the Guidelines”).
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This structure consists of multiple investigative levels. For each
successive level, a higher threshold of suspicion is necessary to
proceed; the investigative tools agents may use are more
intrusive; and procedural safeguards, such as the need for
supervisory approval and limits on the temporal length of
investigations, are more robust.33 The Guidelines continue to
function as the primary constraint on the FBI’s operations and
remain a justification for the lack of a statutory charter
governing the FBI’s activities, but they have not remained
static.34 Multiple modifications made in the years between 1976
and 2001 eased, though ultimately retained, restrictions on
intelligence collection.35
With 9/11, however, came a wholesale rejection of the antiintelligence-collection mindset of the Levi era, resulting in a
dramatic shift in favor of an aggressive prevention paradigm. The
FBI’s prioritization of preventing terrorism was reflected not only
in the allocation of its resources, its focus, and its conception of its
core mission but also in some dramatic modifications to the
Guidelines themselves.36 The eventual result was a set of
33. See THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON DOMESTIC SECURITY
INVESTIGATIONS (Nov. 4, 1976), reprinted in FBI Statutory Charter: Hearings on
S.1612 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Pt. 3, 95th Cong., 18–26 (2d
Sess. 1978) (setting out the standards for opening an investigation, the
investigative tactics available for each type of investigation, and what level of
supervisory approval each type of investigation and tactic required, as well as
time limits on investigations). For a more detailed description of the Levi
Guidelines, see BERMAN, supra note 32, at 10–13.
34. See AGG COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 30, at 59 (“Attorneys General
and FBI leadership have . . . referred to the FBI’s adherence to the Guidelines
as the reason why the FBI should not be subjected to a general legislative
charter or to statutory control.”).
35. For a detailed account of the historical evolution of the Guidelines, see
BERMAN, supra note 32, at 8–25.
36. See Dan Eggan & Bob Woodward, F.B.I. Probe of Al Qaeda Implies
Wide Presence, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2001, at A1 (“Attorney General John D.
Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III have repeatedly said they view
preventing another terror attack as their main priority, rather than securing
criminal convictions.”); Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: TerrorismSupport Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 27−28
(2005) (discussing Attorney General Ashcroft’s statements that terrorism
prevention was the FBI and Justice Department’s “overriding priority”); Tom
Lininger, Sects, Lies, and Videotape: The Surveillance and Infiltration of
Religious Groups, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1204, 1228 (2004) (discussing the shifting
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Guidelines—which were implemented by Attorney General
Michael Mukasey in 2008 and remain in effect today—embodying
an unprecedented license for domestic intelligence collection and
delegating to the FBI responsibility for imposing limits on that
power.37
In this Part, Section A demonstrates the scope of some of the
FBI’s contemporary intelligence-collection powers and their
potential to create tension with privacy; rights of association,
expression, and religious exercise; and equal protection
principles.38 Section B then argues that the absence of
nondoctrinal checks—whether practical, judicial, political, or
priorities caused by the 9/11 terrorist attacks); JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES,
RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS, § VI
(2002) [hereinafter ASHCROFT GUIDELINES] (proclaiming the FBI’s “central
mission” as “preventing the commission of terrorist acts against the United
States and its people”).
37. MICHAEL MUKASEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS (2008) [hereinafter MUKASEY
GUIDELINES]. Attorney General Mukasey’s Guidelines, which remain in
operation today, consolidate the Guidelines for criminal and domestic
intelligence investigations with those for National Security Investigations and
Foreign Intelligence Collection Guidelines. Id. § I.D.1. They also incorporate
rules formerly contained in the Supplemental Guidelines for Collection,
Retention, and Dissemination of Foreign Intelligence; the Guidelines for
Reporting and Use of Information Concerning Violation of Law and
Authorization for Participating in Otherwise Illegal Activity in FBI Foreign
Intelligence, Counterintelligence, or International Terrorism Intelligence
Investigations; and the Guidelines for Reporting on Civil Disorders and
Demonstrations Involving a Federal Interest. Id.
38. See Samuel J. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam? The Law and
Strategy of Counter-Radicalization, 64 STAN. L. REV. 125, 162 (2012) (noting the
friction with the Constitution’s Establishment Clause caused by the government
espousing particular interpretations of Islam). The Guidelines have been subject
to much criticism along these lines since 9/11. See, e.g., Lininger, supra note 36,
at 1231–54 (analyzing Attorney General Ashcroft’s new Guidelines and the
dangers they pose to religious freedom, the threat that they create for racial and
religious profiling, and the risk of inefficient use of resources); see also Daniel J.
Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112,
151–59 (2007) (suggesting that First Amendment claims arising out of domestic
investigations should be cognizable); Linda E. Fisher, Guilty by Expressive
Association: Political Profiling, Surveillance and the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ.
L. REV. 621, 643–57 (2004) (arguing that the law should bar federal officials
from engaging in surveillance triggered by First Amendment activity without
reasonable suspicion of a crime).
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structural—on domestic intelligence collection means that the
only constraints on the FBI’s intelligence-collection powers are
the internal rules that the Justice Department and the FBI have
imposed on themselves.
A. The Scope of the FBI’s Intelligence-Collection Powers
Statutory and constitutional doctrine provides very few
limits on government access to a vast amount of information
about innocent Americans.39 Any information that we have
disclosed to a third-party individual or business entity, for
example, lacks Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.40 Thus the Constitution
places no limits on the collection of information contained in
credit card transactions, bank records, Internet service provider
(ISP) records, Amazon.com transaction histories, Facebook
activities, electronic toll records, cell-tower location data (in some
jurisdictions41), and even statements made to undercover agents
or government informants—regardless of whether the agent or
informant discloses his intention to share the contents of the
conversation.42 The First Amendment similarly lacks purchase
39. See Rascoff, supra note 6, at 589 (describing the “doctrinal vacuum” in
the law of domestic intelligence); Anjali Dalal, Administrative Constitutionalism
and The Re-Entrenchment of Surveillance Culture 24–29 (Mar. 4, 2013)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2236502 (arguing that contemporary constitutional
norms surrounding surveillance practices are in part a result of the
entrenchment over time of the policy preferences of the FBI, the Attorney
General, and the President) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
40. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (stating that
disclosure to a third party negates any expectation of privacy, and therefore
Fourth Amendment does not apply); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745
(1979) (stating that when Smith dialed a phone number he was disclosing that
number to the phone company, and therefore had no legitimate expectation of
privacy over the fact that he dialed that number).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777 (6th Cir. 2012)
(stating that DEA did not violate Fourth Amendment when using cell phone to
track location without a warrant). The Supreme Court has not ruled on this
question.
42. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 300–02 (1966) (stating that
when an undercover informant was invited into the hotel room of the defendant,
there was no expectation of privacy and therefore no Fourth Amendment issue).
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here. Intelligence-collection powers that impact religious practice
would likely run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause as a facial
matter only if they were being implemented with the purpose of
suppressing religious exercise.43 And if the Guidelines chill
expression or curtail association, the activities they permit would
be immune to facial constitutional challenge so long as they were
narrowly tailored to further the compelling interesting in
preventing terrorism, an interest that has been afforded great
weight by the courts.44 Statutes provide only slightly more
protection.45
The permissiveness of the doctrine means that the FBI’s
intelligence-collection powers face very few external legal
constraints. In this doctrinal vacuum, the Attorney General was
able to make several post-9/11 amendments to the Guidelines
that facilitate an aggressive intelligence-collection role for the
FBI. The first relevant amendment is the Guidelines’ expression
of the FBI’s newly adopted preventive mission. Specific language
explicitly affirms the FBI’s role in the intelligence community and
specifies authority to collect, retain, and analyze information for
intelligence purposes. The Guidelines declare that “[t]he FBI is
an intelligence agency as well as a law enforcement agency . . .
[whose]
functions
accordingly
extend
beyond
limited
43. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531
(1993) (noting that laws of general application need not be motivated by an
important government interest, even if they infringe on individuals’ religious
rights).
44. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 130 S.Ct.
2705, 2730 (2010) (holding that the First Amendment burden imposed by the
criminal material support statute was outweighed by the government’s interest
in national security). The Guidelines could be implemented in ways that are
vulnerable to an as-applied challenge, but such challenges are likely futile for
reasons explained in Part II.B.2.
45. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104–91, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.) (requiring the Attorney General to create guidelines that protect the
privacy of patient information); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–
2522 (2000)) (protecting the privacy of electronic communications, but expressly
permitting disclosure to law enforcement agencies); Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) (authorizing under specified circumstances
electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information).
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investigations of discrete matters”46 and urge the Bureau to use
its analytic authority to “identify and understand trends, causes,
and potential indicia of criminal activity and other threats to the
United States that would not be apparent from the investigation
of discrete matters alone.”47 To facilitate this analytical project,
the Guidelines provide that all information collected “at all stages
of investigative activity is . . . to be retained and disseminated for
[intelligence purposes to facilitate the solution and prevention of
crime, protect the national security, and further foreign
intelligence objectives] regardless of whether it furthers
investigative objectives in a narrower or more immediate
sense.”48 Even information that wholly exonerates a group or
individual from suspicion remains in government databases for
storage, analysis (sometimes by algorithmic data-mining), and
dissemination for inclusion in other government agencies’
databases.49
The 2008 Mukasey Guidelines also expanded the Bureau’s
collection powers to further its preventive mission—both with
respect to what information it is permitted to collect and what
tactics it may employ in that collection. The most significant of
these expansions is the authorization of “assessments”—a new
investigative stage. Assessments, which are inquiries designed to
determine whether further investigation is warranted, require
only an “authorized purpose,” meaning that the FBI must merely
determine that it is acting to protect against criminal or nationalsecurity threats, or to collect foreign intelligence.50 There is no
need for any concrete facts, evidence, or reason to believe that the
subject of an assessment is involved in criminal or threatening
46. MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 37, at Intro. B.
47. Id. § IV.
48. Id. § II.
49. The National Counterterrorism Center, a central depository for
counterterrorism information, recently revised its guidelines to permit the
retention for five years of information about Americans even when there is no
suspicion of terrorist ties—increased from 180 days. Charlie Savage, U.S.
Relaxes Limits on Use of Data in Terror Analysis, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/politics/us-moves-to-relax-somerestrictions-for-counterterrorism-analysis.html?_r=0 (last visited Nov. 13, 2013)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
50. MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § II.
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activity.51 In other words, assessments may be undertaken in the
absence of any “factual predicat[e].”52 Until 2008, some form of
factual predication was required to initiate any level of
investigation.53 The introduction of nonpredicated investigations
is thus a significant expansion of the FBI’s power.
Despite the absence of the need to establish a factual basis
for an assessment, agents conducting assessments under the new
Guidelines have available to them a wide array of highly
intrusive investigative tools. During an assessment, the FBI may:
(1) recruit and task informants to attend surreptitiously First
Amendment-protected gatherings—such as religious services or
political demonstrations—to collect information about what takes
place there and who attends;54 (2) engage people in conversation
while misrepresenting the agent’s status as a federal official (socalled “pretext interviews”)—such as posing as an investigative
target’s new neighbor or business associate in order to gather
information about her from friends, neighbors, and colleagues;55
(3) station agents outside a target’s home or office—or even have
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Director, Washington Legislative
Office, ACLU et al., to Eric H. Holder, Att’y Gen. of the United States (Oct. 20,
2011),
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu_letter_to_ag_re_rm_102011_0.pdf
(noting that in “2008 [the Guidelines] removed any requirement of a factual
predicate to justify a new type of investigation, called an ‘Assessment’”).
54. See MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § II.A.4.e; J.M. Berger, Does
the F.B.I. Have an Informant Problem?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 7, 2012),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/07/does_the_fbi_have_an_informa
nt_problem (last visited Nov. 14, 2013) (discussing “growing media scrutiny”
over the FBI’s professional informants’ conduct) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review). Historically, the FBI has infiltrated political and religious
groups for the purpose of disrupting their operations and creating a chilling
effect on antigovernment expression. See Lininger, supra note 36, at 1235−36
(discussing government infiltration of religious organizations); FREDERICK A. O.
SCHWARZ JR. & AZIZ Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER
IN A TIME OF TERROR 31–36 (2007) (describing the Church Committee’s findings
regarding the FBI’s politically motivated investigations); Don Edwards,
Reordering the Priorities of the FBI in Light of the End of the Cold War, 65 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 59, 73 (1991) (describing politically motivated investigations in
the 1980s).
55. See MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § II.A.4.f (“Interview or
request information from members of the public and private entities.”).
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them followed—so that their movements are tracked day and
night;56 and (4) search commercial online services and resources,
records maintained by “other federal, state, local, or tribal, or
foreign governmental entities or agencies,”57 and all FBI and
Justice Department records.58 This includes the FBI’s National
Security Branch’s data set “[c]omposed of government
information, commercial databases and records acquired in
criminal and terrorism probes”59 that includes international
travel records of citizens and aliens; financial forms; hotel and
rental car records; and credit card transaction records.60 The
government can not only search these databases for particular
information, but also use them to perform analysis based on a
“pattern of behavior and search for that pattern in data sets.”61
Ever-more sophisticated data-mining tools render a detailed
dossier on any American—even one entirely above suspicion—
just one mouse click away. Thus, the Guidelines now permit, with
no factual predicate, tactics that before 9/11 had been reserved
for investigative stages whose initiation required at least some
relevant evidence.62
56. See id. § II.A.4.h (“Engage in observation or surveillance not requiring
a court order.”).
57. Id. § II.A.4.c. As of 2009, the FBI planned to expand this data set to
include tax records from nonprofit organizations, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FBI,
NAT’L SECURITY ANALYSIS CTR., AN ELEMENT OF THE FBI’S NATIONAL SECURITY
BRANCH (2006), and the Bureau has launched a database of biometric
information, which includes “[d]igital images of faces, fingerprints and palm
patterns.” Ellen Nakashima, FBI Prepares Vast Database of Biometrics: $1
Billion Project to Include Images of Irises and Faces, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2007,
at A1.
58. See Robert M. Chesney, Civil Liberties and the Terrorism Prevention
Paradigm: The Guilt by Association Critique, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1408, 1425
(2003) (quoting Attorney General Ashcroft); ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note
36, §§ VI.A. & B (allowing the FBI to use other governmental agencies’
information and information from previous investigations when pursuing
intelligence collection in counterterrorism activities).
59. Ryan Singel, Newly Declassified Files Detail Massive FBI Data-Mining
Project, WIRED.COM (Sept. 23, 2009, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/
2009/09/fbi-nsac/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
60. See id. (describing the breadth of the FBI’s data-mining project).
61. Id.
62. See BERMAN, supra note 32, at 13–21 (discussing the erosion of the
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Even investigative tactics statutorily limited to instances in
which there is a factual basis for suspicion may be permitted
based on very tenuous links to suspected wrongdoing. Agents can
issue National Security Letters (NSLs)—a form of administrative
subpoena—to access without a court order certain information
about individuals that is “relevant” to a terrorism investigation.63
The relevance standard means that the individual about whom
the FBI seeks information—internet or telephone subscriber
information (possibly including cell-phone-generated location
data providing a minute-by-minute account of an individual’s
movements64), internet search records, financial records—need
not herself be a target of an investigation. And after acquiring a
court order under § 215 of the PATRIOT Act65, the FBI may
demand an even broader swath of information—“any tangible
thing” that is “relevant to” “a full investigation,”66 a definition the
government has interpreted to include the authority to collect all
noncontent data regarding phone calls into, out of, and within the
United States.67
protections provided by the Levi Guidelines).
63. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 505, 115 Stat.
272, 365 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.) (setting out a “relevance”
standard for obtaining information through use of National Security Letters);
DIOG, supra note 12, § 18.6.6 (discussing the National Security Letter process).
64. See David Kravets, Surveillance Strategy Is ‘Privileged and
Confidential,’ FBI Says, WIRED.COM (Jan. 16, 2013, 4:38 PM),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/01/fbi-surveillance-strategy/ (last visited
Nov. 13, 2013) (discussing FBI’s assertion that cellphone location data does not
enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore can be obtained without
a warrant based on probable cause) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
65. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 505, 115 Stat. 272
(codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
66. Id. § 215. Other post-9/11 statutes also relaxed limits on the use of
investigative tactics. See, e.g., Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (codified in scattered sections of
U.S.C.) (extending authority to collect electronic communications under FISA to
“lone wolf” terrorists—individuals engaged in terrorist activities but not
connected to an international terrorist organization); FISA Amendments Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881, 1812,
1885) (expanding authority to collect electronic communications under FISA to
targets “reasonably believed to be outside the United States” without any
showing of probable cause or particularized suspicion).
67. See Greenwald, supra note 1 (discussing a court order that “compels
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In addition to the obvious privacy concerns raised by these
rules, Professor Daniel Solove has also pointed out the potential
for chill to First Amendment-protected activity when the FBI is
engaged in widespread intelligence-gathering activities such as
acquisition of internet search history; book purchases; phone call
or email records; banking records; questioning an individual’s
friends, neighbors, or colleagues; infiltrating religious or political
gatherings; or using ISPs to identify individuals writing
anonymous political blogs.68 Indeed, there is evidence that the
FBI’s tactics have had this very effect in Muslim communities,
where there is evidence of chill on attendance at political
demonstrations, donations to political causes, speaking out
against U.S. foreign policy, participating in community
organizations, internet use, and book purchase habits.69
Law enforcement surveillance of antiwar protesters and
other political dissenters raises similar concerns about expressive
and associational activities. A 2010 Justice Department review
found that investigations of Greenpeace, People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals, and antiwar groups used “troubling”
tactics.70 In the course of these investigations, the FBI classified
nonviolent civil disobedience as “acts of terrorism,” extended
investigations “without adequate basis,” and unnecessarily placed
several Greenpeace members on federal watch lists.71 Members of
similarly situated groups may harbor concerns that their political
activities will attract government attention, the result of which

Verizon to produce to the NSA electronic copies of ‘all call detail records or
“telephony metadata” created by Verizon for communications between the
United States and abroad’ or ‘wholly within the United States, including local
telephone calls’” (internal citations omitted)).
68. See Solove, supra note 38, at 151–76 (discussing the First Amendment
implications of modern intelligence gathering).
69. See Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement, supra note 7, at 69–71
(discussing the chilling effects on the Muslim community caused by law
enforcement actions).
70. Richard A. Serrano, FBI Improperly Investigated Activities, Justice
TIMES
(Sept.
21,
2010),
Department
Review
Finds,
L.A.
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/sep/21/nation/la-na-fbi-activists-20100921 (last
visited Nov. 13, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
71. Id.
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could be inclusion on a watch-list or even becoming the target of
an investigation.
The FBI’s aggressive investigation and infiltration of houses
of worship can also chill the exercise of religious freedoms.72 As a
result of the FBI’s use of undercover agents or informants in
mosques, Muslim leaders across the country have reported “a
reduction in attendance at mosques, a change in the language
used at worship services, a decrease in contributions to Muslim
charities, and an erosion of the trust and good will that are
essential to the vitality of a religious community.”73 Studies have
also shown that these tactics have also deterred members of the
Muslim community from wearing clothing that expresses
religious or cultural identities.74
72. Reports suggest that the DIOG requires a Special Operations Review
Committee (SORC) to approve surveillance inside mosques. See Jessica
Chasmar, Mosques Off-Limits by Government Snooping Since 2011, IBD
Editorial Says, WASH. TIMES (June 13, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2013/jun/13/mosques-limits-government-snooping-2011-ibd-editor/
(last
visited Nov. 13, 2013) (discussing the intersection of FBI intelligence-gathering
and religious observation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
But the rules regarding undisclosed participation in political and religious
events are redacted from the public version of the DIOG pursuant to FOIA’s
exemption for law enforcement material, as are the provisions regarding the
responsibilities and makeup of the SORC. See DIOG, supra note 12, §§ 16,
18.5.5.3, 18.6 (describing undisclosed participation procedures, the fact that the
FBI should use the least intrusive method possible, and the authorized
investigation methods used in preliminary investigations); 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(7)(E) (2012) (exempting from disclosure information compiled for law
enforcement purposes “if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk
circumvention of the law”).
73. Lininger, supra note 36, at 1233–34 (citations omitted); Fisher, supra
note 38, at 647–49 (“The chilling of protected expression that accompanies
political surveillance impedes the group’s ability to realize fully its political or
religious purposes.”); see also Int’l Religious Freedom Report, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Int’l Operations, House Int’l Relations Comm., 108th Cong. 67
(2002) (statement of Nihad Awad, Exec. Dir. of Council on American-Islamic
Relations) (stating that at least three Muslim charities “have been effectively
shut down”). Impediments to charitable giving interfere with Muslims’ ability to
practice the Islamic duty of zakat (alms giving). See id. at 67–68 (“These
closures [of Muslim charities] have had a wide impact . . . . Donors view such
organizations as essential to the ability of Muslims to practice the religious duty
of zakat (alms giving), a pillar of their faith.”).
74. See Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement, supra note 7, at 69–71
(detailing evidence that members of the Muslim Community refrain from
expressing their religious or cultural identities).
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Any of these intelligence-collection tactics may also be
discriminatorily implemented, disproportionately burdening
particular minorities. The use of unpredicated investigations in
particular opens the door to investigative decisions based on the
use of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion. Historically,
when law enforcement officials have been permitted to collect
intelligence on groups and individuals suspected—without any
objective basis—of harboring ill will toward the United States,
the burden of that investigative activity has fallen on groups that
espouse disfavored ideologies, minorities, or others who are
perceived as threatening.75
The more specific DIOG rules magnify concerns about
discriminatory implementation. Under the DIOG, the FBI may
collect information regarding ethnic and racial behaviors
“reasonably believed to be associated with a particular criminal
or terrorist element of an ethnic community.”76 Official
expressions regarding how individuals become “radicalized”
actually identify certain religious activities—such as Muslim men
growing beards—as potential precursors to violent extremism,
thus providing theoretical grounds for investigative decisions
based at least in part on exactly these types of activities.77
Investigative activity based in part on racial or ethnic
characteristics is not limited to scrutiny of individuals. FBI policy
also embraces “community mapping”—the practice of collecting
and storing information about particular ethnic communities.78
75. The Supreme Court has noted that protections against intrusive
surveillance “become the more necessary when the targets of official
surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their political beliefs.”
United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972).
76. DIOG, supra note 12, § 4.3.3.2.4.
77. See Aziz Z. Huq, Modeling Radicalization Theory, 2 DUKE F.L. & SOC.
CHANGE 39, 46–47 (2010) (“The ‘typical signatures’ of the pre-radicalization
phase, for example are . . . ‘[w]earing traditional Islamic clothing, growing a
beard’; and ‘[b]ecoming involved in social activism and community issues.’”
(alterations in original) (quoting MITCHELL D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, N.Y.
POLICE DEP’T, RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST: THE HOMEGROWN THREAT 31 (2d ed.
2009))). But see MUSLIM AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES COAL., COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY,
MACLC’S CRITIQUE OF THE NYPD’S REPORT ON HOMEGROWN RADICALISM 6−7
(2008), http://maclcnypdcritique.files.wordpress.com/2008/11/counterterrorismpolicy-final-paper3.pdf (critiquing the NYPD’s position).
78. See DIOG, supra note 12, § 4.3.3.2.2 (“[I]f information about community
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The rules “permit the FBI to identify locations of concentrated
ethnic communities” as well as to collect “the locations of ethnicoriented businesses and other facilities” (including religious
facilities such as mosques) because “members of certain terrorist
organizations live and operate primarily within a certain
concentrated community of the same ethnicity.”79 The DIOG
justifies such activity by asserting that concentrations of certain
ethnic communities provide an opportunity for “identified
terrorist subjects from certain countries [to] relocate to blend in
and avoid detection.”80 Under these authorities, the FBI has
collected information about religious, ethnic, and national-origin
characteristics of American communities, identifying “ArabAmerican and Muslim communities in Michigan as a potential
terrorist recruitment ground” as well as noting “an increase in
the African-American population of Georgia when analyzing
demographics may be collected, it may be ‘mapped.’ Sophisticated computer geomapping technology visually depicts lawfully collected information and can
assist in showing relationships among disparate data.”).
79. Id. § 4.3.3.2.1. This same idea was proposed by local law enforcement
authorities in Los Angeles but ultimately abandoned when the Muslim and civil
liberties communities noted that it was likely to alienate Muslim residents. See
Richard Winton et al., LAPD to Build Data on Muslim Areas, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 9,
2007), http://articles.latimes.com/2007/nov/09/local/me-lapd9 (last visited Nov.
13, 2013) (discussing the proposal and its demise) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Richard Winton & Teresa Watanabe, LAPD’s Muslim
Mapping Plan Killed, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2007), http://articles.
latimes.com/2007/nov/15/local/me-muslim15 (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (same)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Reports that the NYPD has
engaged in similar practices with respect to Muslim communities in New York
have sparked significant controversy. See, e.g., Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo,
NYPD: Muslim Spying Led to No Leads, Terror Cases, ASSOC. PRESS (Aug. 21,
2012), http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2012/NYPD-Muslim-spyingled-to-no-leads-terror-cases (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (“The Demographics
Unit is at the heart of a police spying program, built with help from the CIA,
which assembled databases on where Muslims lived, shopped, worked and
prayed.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Rocco
Parascandola, et al., NYPD Commissioner Raymond Kelly Defends Police Spying
on Muslims, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.nydailynews.com/newyork/nypd-commissioner-raymond-kelly-defends-police-spying-muslims-article1.1029190 (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (“[C]ops . . . watch[ed] Muslim
neighborhoods and bought . . . computers they used to store reams of
information about innocent Muslim college students, mosque sermons and social
events . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
80. DIOG, supra note 12, § 4.3.3.2.1.
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‘Black Separatist’ groups,” pointing to Chinese and Russian
communities in San Francisco “as a place to look for organized
crime syndicates,” and “highlighted Latino communities as
potentially harboring the Central American gang MS-13.”81
The Guidelines are not blind to the concerns these tactics
raise. In fact, they bar the FBI from initiating investigations into
U.S. persons “solely for the purpose of monitoring activities
protected by the First Amendment.”82 Nor may the Bureau
“predicat[e] an investigation simply based on somebody’s race.”83
But the Guidelines as well as the DIOG prevent such activity
only when it is motivated solely by the desire to monitor First
Amendment-protected activities, or by race, religion, or national
origin.84 Investigative activity prompted in part by these factors
is not barred.85 Individuals thus can be singled out for scrutiny
due, at least in part, to their political or religious expressions,
81. Charlie Savage, F.B.I. Scrutinized for Amassing Data on American
Communities, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/10/21/us/aclu-releases-fbi-documents-on-american-communities.html?_r=0
(last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
82. MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § I.C.3.
83. Michael Mukasey, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., Remarks Prepared for
Delivery by Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey at the Oregon AntiTerrorism Conference & Training (Aug. 13, 2008) [hereinafter Mukasey Speech],
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2008/ag-speech0808133.html.
84. See, e.g., MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § I.C.3 (“These
Guidelines do not authorize investigating or collecting or maintaining
information . . . solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the
First Amendment . . . .”); DIOG, supra note 12, § 4.2 (“[I]nvestigative activity
may not be based solely on the exercise of rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment . . . .”).
85. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Signaling Function of Religious Speech in
Domestic Counterterrorism, 89 TEX. L. REV. 833, 842 (2011) (“[L]aw enforcement
and prosecutors turn to religious speech as a signal of terrorist risk.”). Note also
that after the Supreme Court decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
any speech undertaken in coordination with a designated Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO) is criminal. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct.
2705, 2730 (2010) (“We hold that, in regulating the particular forms of support
that plaintiffs seek to provide to foreign terrorist organizations [through 18
U.S.C. § 2339B], Congress has pursued that objective consistent with the
limitations of the First and Fifth Amendments.”). Thus, any indication that an
individual supports an FTO or its political positions could trigger government
scrutiny.
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activities, or associations. This profiling on the basis of “national
origin plus” could expose a large population of innocent persons to
FBI scrutiny. Indeed, as law enforcement officials told the
Associated Press, “[a]mong the factors that could make someone
the subject of an investigation is travel to regions of the world
known for terrorist activity . . . along with the person’s race or
ethnicity.”86 Thus, every individual of Pakistani origin who
travels to Pakistan to visit family is conceivably at risk of being
subjected to FBI investigation merely on that basis.
A final notable modification to the Guidelines implemented
in 2008 was the elimination of the vast majority of oversight
provisions contained in prior iterations of the Guidelines—time
limits on investigations, the need to obtain supervisory approval,
requirements to report regularly to FBI Headquarters or the
Justice Department.87 Instead, these restrictions have been
relegated to the DIOG, thereby empowering the FBI to determine
the scope of its own power in this regard.88 Indeed, the DIOG may
be changed whenever the FBI—not the Attorney General—
determines that it should be (as it was in 201189), and FBI
86. Lara Jakes Jordan, AP Impact: Race Profiling Eyed for Terror Probes,
USA TODAY (July 2, 2008), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/topstories/
2008-07-02-926742133_x.htm. (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
87. See MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § II (“These Guidelines do not
impose supervisory approval requirements in assessments . . . .”); id. § II.B.2
(providing that “a predicated investigation requires supervisory approval” only
if “relating to foreign intelligence”); id. § II.B.5 (requiring FBI Headquarters be
notified of predicated investigations only in limited instances); id. (imposing no
limits on the duration of investigations).
88. See DIOG, supra note 12, §§ 3.4, 18 (setting supervisory approval
requirements, placing time limits on some investigations, and requiring periodic
reviews for all investigations); id. § 10 (increasing oversight for “sensitive
investigative matters,” such as investigations of politicians, political or religious
organizations, or members of the news media).
89. The 2011 changes to the DIOG loosened some existing restrictions. The
DIOG now authorizes a number of investigative techniques even before opening
an assessment, such as accessing information in the databases of federal, local,
or state governments; interviewing a “complainant”; and searching publicly
available information (including social media sites). See Charlie Savage, F.B.I.
Agents Get Leeway to Push Privacy Bounds, N.Y. TIMES, (June 12, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/us/13fbi.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2013)
(“The new rules add to several measures taken over the past decade to give
agents more latitude as they search for signs of criminal or terrorist activity.”)
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leadership can authorize departures from the DIOG’s
requirements.90
There may have been good reason for some of these changes.
Indeed, some of them were the result of recommendations made
by the 9/11 Commission to improve America’s counterterrorism
capacity.91 There have, after all, been significant changes since
1976—in the threats that we face, in the need for intelligence
gathering, in Americans’ expectations of what their government
should do to protect them and their interests. The limits on FBI
intelligence activities imposed in the 1970s, however, reflected
concerns expressed by the legislature and the public.92 The
current Guidelines, by contrast, have fundamentally transformed
the role of America’s primary domestic federal law enforcement
agency with almost no public debate and with no legislative
action.93 Thus, regardless of what one thinks about the propriety
of the changes themselves, we might question the adequacy of the
process leading to such a transformation.
B. Existing Failures of Intelligence-Collection Governance
If the FBI’s intelligence-collection authorities do not run
afoul of existing legal limits, why is the way in which they are
governed a cause for concern? Because despite these authorities’

(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
90. See DIOG, supra note 12, § 2.7.2 (providing the authorization to depart
from DIOG procedures). Such departures must not violate the Guidelines
themselves. Id.
91. See Jordan, supra note 86 (“Law enforcement officials say the proposed
policy would help them do exactly what Congress demanded after the Sept. 11,
2001, attacks: root out terrorists before they strike.”).
92. See Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., The Church Committee, Then and
Now, in U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE AND DEMOCRACY 25 (Russell A.
Miller ed., 2008) (“Attorney General Edward Levi and President Gerald Ford,
followed by President Jimmy Carter, had issued guidelines and executive orders
in response to the Church Committee’s revelations that went part of the way
toward the goals of the Church Committee.”).
93. See Dalal, supra note 39, at 14–24 (discussing the “steady unmooring of
the Attorney General Guidelines from the rights-protecting framework
enshrined in 1976”).
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undisputed implications for civil liberties94—indeed, their
tendency to result in civil liberties infringements is what inspired
the implementation of the Guidelines in the first instance—they
are untouched by the nondoctrinal constraints that usually
accompany law enforcement activities. This means that the only
constraints on the FBI’s intelligence-collection powers are the
internal rules the Justice Department and the FBI have imposed
on themselves.
Several inherent differences between intelligence collection
and crime-solving investigations account for the inapplicability of
constraints that usually limit government action. First, the very
nature of the intelligence-collection enterprise is inherently more
expansive in scope—proactive rather than reactive and less
narrowly targeted.95 Consequently, practical constraints that
usually serve to limit law enforcement agencies’ activities—
resource limitations and a focus on solving individual crimes—are
inapplicable. Second, the secretive nature of intelligencecollection activities renders them effectively immune to judicial
review as well as scrutiny from the legislature and the public.96
And third, the Justice Department and the FBI generate the
Guidelines and the DIOG in the context of the FBI’s post-9/11
focus on terrorism prevention.97 This means that the rules are
crafted by government officials with security and intelligencecollection expertise. There are, therefore, no structural checks to
remove from the hands of security technocrats the normative
judgments that must be made about the relative importance of
94. See Schwarz, supra note 92, at 25 (noting the uneasy truce between the
FBI’s authority and civil liberty).
95. See ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 36, § III.B.2 (“The immediate
purpose of a terrorism enterprise investigation is to obtain information
concerning the nature and structure of the enterprise . . . with a view to the
longer range objectives of detection, prevention, and prosecution of the criminal
activities of the enterprise.”).
96. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 655
(6th Cir. 2007) (noting that the state secrets doctrine would prevent discovery of
whether plaintiffs were actually wiretapped).
97. See FBI, QUICK FACTS, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/quick-facts (last
visited Oct. 20, 2013) (listing “[p]rotect[ing] the United States from terrorist
attack[s]” as the FBI’s number one priority) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Law Review).
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aggressive intelligence collection and rights protections.98 The
result is that, despite the fact that intelligence collection
implicates important values, the only constraints on that
collection are effectively self-imposed.
1. Intelligence Collection and Practical Constraints
Intelligence collection compliments and overlaps with
criminal investigation, but it is a distinct endeavor. Crime-solving
efforts are tied to individual cases. They focus on the
investigations of specific acts in an effort to collect evidence
related to each element of a completed or impending crime, and
tend to end with a decision to prosecute or not to prosecute.99 As
previous versions of the Guidelines recognize, criminal
investigations are more circumscribed in scope and tend to be
shorter in duration than intelligence investigations.100
Intelligence investigations, by contrast, call for much different—
and much broader—investigative activities, which “may continue
for several years.”101 Furthermore, the focus of such
investigations “‘may be less precise than that directed against
more conventional types of crime. . . . For this reason the
investigation is broader and less discriminate than usual,’”102
seeking information about potential targets as well as criminal or
terrorist organizations, their members, their goals, and their
sources of funding.103 Thus, the goal of intelligence collection is to
gather as much information as possible for future analysis, rather
than seeking only information connected to a discrete incident.

98. See infra Part III.C.1 (discussing the deficiencies of administrative selfgovernance).
99. See ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 36, § III (“As a general rule, an
investigation of a completed criminal act is normally confined to determining
who committed that act and securing evidence to establish the elements of the
particular offense.”).
100. See, e.g., id. § III (recognizing the difference between criminal and
intelligence investigations).
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972)).
103. Id. § III.B.3.
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A law enforcement agency focused on crime solving is less
likely to allocate time and resources to the types of activities
currently taking place under the Guidelines. While that agency
may be permitted, for example, to place an individual under
twenty-four-hour surveillance or attend political rallies,104 it is
unlikely to devote scarce manpower to such activities if there is
no factual basis for doing so.105 If an agency’s primary goal,
however, is to collect as much information as possible to include
in a database because it is impossible to know what information
might eventually lead to the prevention of a threat or crime, then
its ability to engage in that collection will be supported by
sufficient funds and manpower. Recent technological advances
exacerbate this phenomenon because they have made the
collection and storage of information infinitely cheaper and easier
than ever before.106
In order to ensure that the FBI engages in the broad
investigative activities associated with intelligence collection, the
Guidelines—initially imposed to restrict domestic intelligence
collection—have been transformed into Guidelines expressly
facilitating and encouraging such activity. They remind agents
that they “cannot be content to wait for leads to come through the
action of others” and thus “must proactively draw on available
sources of information.”107 In so doing, they both expand the FBI’s
104. See id. § II.B(5)(b), (6)(g) (authorizing the use of nonconsensual
electronic surveillance, physical or photographic surveillance, or any other
investigative technique covered under chapter 119 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code).
105. See id. § II.C(1) (“A general crimes investigation may be initiated by the
FBI when facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that a federal crime has
been, is being, or will be committed.”).
106. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet:
A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1013–15 (2010) (recognizing that
the digital storage of data means that unlimited data, which can be located
anywhere, can be made available to the government); Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board, Workshop Regarding Surveillance Programs
Operated Pursuant to Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and Section 702 of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Transcript at 300 (July 9, 2013)
(statement of Greg Nojeim, Ctr. for Democracy & Tech.), http://www.
pclob.gov/SiteAssets/9-july-2013/Public%20Workshop%20-%20Full.pdf (noting
that “something has to substitute for the friction that used to be in the system
because there wasn’t an ability to collect all this information about all human
interaction . . . that we have now”).
107. MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § II.
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authorized powers and relax the limits on how those powers may
be used. Because they will be utilized far more expansively than
their crime-solving counterparts, which existing doctrine evolved
to regulate, the FBI’s powers present a greater threat to
fundamental values than existing doctrine may indicate.
2. Intelligence Collection and Judicial or Political Constraints
In engaging in the broad intelligence-collection activities
envisioned by the Guidelines, the FBI will elude traditional
checks on power, such as judicial review and congressional or
public oversight. The result is that the Guidelines and their
implementation lack both the accountability and the democratic
legitimacy that usually accompanies government policy.108
There are several obstacles to judicial review of the
Guidelines and the activities undertaken pursuant to them. As an
initial matter, the Guidelines themselves disclaim any intention
to create enforceable rights, so any action taken pursuant to them
can be challenged only if it is otherwise unlawful.109 In addition,
the secrecy of these activities ensures that individuals who seek
to challenge intelligence-collection regimes will struggle to
demonstrate a sufficiently concrete injury to establish standing to
sue.110 Surveillance tactics are designed to prevent targets from
being alerted to the fact that law enforcement is gathering
information about them, so it is difficult to point to specific
government action causing harm.111 Moreover, courts have held
108. See infra notes 121–138 and accompanying text.
109. See MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § I.D.2 (“The[se guidelines]
are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights,
substantive or procedural, enforceable by law by any party in any matter, civil
or criminal . . . .”).
110. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)
(“[S]tanding . . . [requires the plaintiff to suffer an] ‘injury in fact’—an invasion
of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and
(b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical”’” (footnote omitted)
(citations omitted)).
111. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d) (2012) (imposing gag orders on entities
receiving requests for information from the FBI); 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b) (allowing
law enforcement to delay warrant notice requirements under certain
circumstances); Rascoff, supra note 6, at 596 (“[I]ndividuals who allegedly are
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that neither allegations of general chill nor an “objectively
reasonable likelihood” that a plaintiffs’ communications will be
subject to surveillance are sufficient.112 Thus, standing remains a
bar to the courthouse door.
Another barrier that has proved fatal to judicial review of
intelligence collection is the state secrets privilege,113 which
allows the government to withhold evidence whose disclosure
might endanger national security.114 At times the privilege
results in a case being dismissed outright.115 In other instances, a
being spied on illegally tend to be unaware of that fact. . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
112. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1152 (2013)
(“Because respondents do not face a threat of certainly impending interception
under § 1881a, the costs that they have incurred to avoid surveillance are
simply the product of their fear of surveillance . . . [this] is insufficient to create
standing.” (footnote omitted)); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972)
(“Allegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are not an adequate substitute for a claim of
specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm; ‘the federal
courts established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution do not render
advisory opinions.’” (quoting United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947))); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493
F.3d 644, 660 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting the “subjective chill” language from
Laird); Rascoff, supra note 6, at 596 (“[I]f certain individuals have some basis for
thinking that they have been the subjects of illegal surveillance, they are often
unable to make . . . [a] definitive showing of injury . . . for constitutional
standing.” (footnotes omitted)).
113. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1093 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc) (dismissing foreign nationals’ claims of harm caused by the
Central Intelligence Agency’s extraordinary rendition program pursuant to the
state secrets doctrine); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 311 (4th Cir.
2007) (dismissing a foreign national’s claim of harm caused by the Central
Intelligence Agency’s extraordinary rendition program pursuant to the state
secrets doctrine); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644,
655 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that the state secrets doctrine would prevent
discovery of whether plaintiffs were actually wiretapped); Fazaga v. FBI, 884 F.
Supp. 2d 1022, 1049 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing claims that the FBI illegally
directed agents to gather information on Southern California Muslim
Communities pursuant to the state secrets doctrine); Rascoff, supra note 6, at
596 (“[E]ven if [a plaintiff has standing], the government is free to invoke the
state secrets privilege and, in effect, unilaterally have the case dismissed . . . .”).
114. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1953) (“[T]he privilege
against revealing military secrets . . . is well established in the law of evidence.”
(footnote omitted)).
115. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1093
(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (dismissing foreign nationals’ claims of harm caused by
the Central Intelligence Agency’s extraordinary rendition program pursuant to
the state secrets doctrine).
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suit may proceed with evidence that the government is willing to
share only ex parte,116 undermining the proceedings’ adversarial
nature.
The government’s investigative actions are most frequently
scrutinized through motions to suppress evidence collected in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.117 But this process generally
eludes the targets of surveillance. When the government gathers
information for the purposes of criminal prosecution and seeks to
introduce it as evidence at trial, only the individual about whom
the information was gathered—the criminal defendant—will have
the opportunity to challenge the government’s actions through a
suppression motion.118 This means that these practices will face
challenges in those circumstances where the government’s case is
most compelling—when a guilty person seeks to exclude
probative inculpatory evidence.119 Moreover, much of the
government’s intelligence-collection activity never leads to
prosecution. As a result, innocent targets of surveillance—those
whose information is collected because it is deemed “relevant” to
an investigation, or members of a house of worship who change
their religious practices due to fear of surveillance—will be
unable to invoke judicial protection.120
The accountability gap left by the absence of judicial review
will not be filled by legislative or public scrutiny. The origin story
of the original Attorney General Guidelines included a significant
role for Congress.121 Having been prompted by the Church
116. See, e.g., United States v. Felt, 491 F. Supp. 179, 183–84 (D.D.C. 1979)
(concluding that in camera, ex-parte review of documents obtained by the FBI
from foreign intelligence sources was appropriate).
117. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(h) (providing the ability to file a motion to
suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
118. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (“[S]tanding to
invoke the exclusionary rule has been confined to situations where the
Government seeks to use such evidence to incriminate the victim of the
unlawful search.”).
119. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107
HARV. L. REV. 757, 796–97 (1994) (“Under the exclusionary rule, the more guilty
you are, the more you benefit.”).
120. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 (discussing who may challenge
government surveillance tactics).
121. See Schwarz, supra note 92, at 25 (noting early legislative involvement
in the Guidelines).
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Committee’s findings of misconduct and the resulting public
outrage, the legislature was intimately involved in developing the
contents of the Guidelines.122 Congress held a series of hearings
on the issue over the course of several years, and saw its
suggestions ultimately reflected in the Levi Guidelines.123 Given
that the Guidelines were implemented, at least in part, to avoid
more stringent legislative action,124 this is not a surprise. Surely
Attorney General Levi knew that if the rules he instituted did not
appear to address Congress’s concerns, they would fail to sap the
momentum for enacting a statutory charter for the FBI.
The contemporary political economy of congressional
oversight in this area means that legislative oversight will not
provide any more effective a check than judicial action.
Legislators’ incentives weigh against aggressive involvement. The
downside risks of unsuccessful counterterrorism policies
(additional attacks) are high.125 If those policies are developed
outside of the legislative process, Congress can share (if not
entirely evade) blame. Moreover, counterterrorism policy “is a
subject matter that is especially prone to legislative delegation
because it often entails hard trade-offs,” which are the types of
questions Congress is least likely to address.126 In addition to
undermining legislative involvement in counterterrorism policy
formulation, existing institutional features also render
122. See FBI Statutory Charter Part 1, Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong. 3–35 (1978) [hereinafter FBI Statutory Charter Part 1]
(questioning the Attorney General about the content of the Guidelines).
123. See, e.g., id. at 1–3 (voicing concerns about illegal FBI activities); FBI
Statutory Charter Part 2, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice &
Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 3−4 (1978) (voicing
concerns about undercover FBI operations); Schwarz, supra note 92, at 25
(“Attorney General Edward Levi . . . issued guidelines and executive orders in
response to the Church Committee’s revelations that went part of the way
toward the goals of the Church Committee.”).
124. See FBI Statutory Charter Part 1, supra note 122, at 25 (noting that the
Guidelines were prompted by the Church Committee’s findings and sought to
avoid drastic legislative action).
125. Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100
CALIF. L. REV. 887, 921 (2002) (“Errors on the security side are more likely to be
widespread, affecting many people and imposing a high political cost.”).
126. See id. at 923 (“[L]egislators will tend . . . to delegate decisions rather
than . . . resolve hard questions themselves.”).
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congressional oversight of domestic intelligence-collection policy
ineffectual. Congress, of course, retains oversight authority over
the FBI.127 If it wants to play a more active role in overseeing the
Guidelines, it has the tools to do so.128 After all, Congress
determines whether and to what degree the FBI’s intelligencecollection activities are funded.129 Moreover, the relevant
committees of jurisdiction conduct regular oversight hearings at
which the Attorney General and FBI Director appear.130
Legislators can ask Justice Department and FBI officials for
information about the Guidelines or the FBI’s activities at any
time.131
Perhaps as a result of the existing incentive structure,
however, Congress has shown little appetite to pursue
Guidelines-related issues of late.132 The most recent modification
to the Guidelines, for example, failed to reflect congressional
input. The Justice Department provided the Senate Judiciary
127. See U.S.H.R. PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, ABOUT,
HISTORY
AND
JURISDICTION,
http://intelligence.house.gov/about/historyjurisdiction (last visited Oct. 29, 2013) (“The HPSCI is charged with the
oversight of the United States Intelligence Community, which includes the
intelligence and intelligence related activities of 17 elements of the U.S.
Government, and the Military Intelligence Program.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); ABOUT U.S.S. SELECT COMM. ON
INTELLIGENCE, http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/about.html (last visited Oct.
29, 2013) (“The Committee meets roughly twice a week for 1 1/2 to 2 hours,
generally in closed session. Most hearings involve appearances by senior
Intelligence Community officials . . . who present testimony and answer
Senators’ questions.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
128. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting all legislative power in Congress); id.
art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (vesting the House of Representatives with the power to impeach
public officials); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (vesting the Senate with the power to try all
impeachments); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (providing the spending power).
129. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (providing the spending power).
130. See, e.g., FBI Oversight, C-SPAN VIDEO LIBRARY, http://www.cspanvideo.org/program/FBIOver (last visited Oct. 31, 2013) (documenting FBI
Director Robert Mueller’s testimony at an FBI oversight hearing before the
House Judiciary Committee on June 13, 2013) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
131. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927) (“[T]he power of
inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to
the legislative function.”).
132. See Rascoff, supra note 6, at 597–98 (providing possible reasons why
congressional oversight of intelligence collection lacks “vitality”).
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Committee a completed draft of the Mukasey Guidelines a few
months before they were implemented.133 A handful of senators
requested that Attorney General Mukasey delay their
implementation until Congress had the opportunity to develop
suggestions regarding ways to minimize civil liberties concerns.134
Their request went unanswered. And even when FBI Director
Robert Mueller III inaccurately testified in 2010 before Congress
that the FBI did not have the authority to conduct unpredicated
investigations, legislators took no follow-up action.135
While Congress has shown little interest in scrutinizing the
Guidelines, the public is not given a choice in the matter. Activity
undertaken pursuant to the Guidelines is secret and therefore
rarely apparent on its own or reported in sufficient detail in the
news media.136 Moreover, information about how the Guidelines
are used is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Act on the basis of either the law enforcement or the
classified-information exemption contained in that statute.137 The
public also lacks means to scrutinize how the rules are
133. See Letter from Sens. Russell Feingold, Edward Kennedy, Richard
Durbin, & Sheldon Whitehouse, to Michael Mukasey, Att’y Gen. of the United
States (Aug. 20, 2008), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/
Justice/20080820.Letter.from.Senators.to.AG.Mukasey.re.FBI.Guidelines.pdf
(noting that a draft of the Mukasey Guidelines was made available to the
Senate Judiciary Committee during August of 2008).
134. See id. (“Before you sign the guidelines, we urge you to make them
available publicly, and to solicit input not only from members of Congress but
also from national security and civil liberties experts . . . .”).
135. See Letter from Stephen Kelly, Asst. Dir., FBI Office of Cong. Affairs, to
Sen. Richard J. Durbin (July 28, 2010), http://www.bordc.org/press/fbidurbin
letter.pdf (alerting the Senator to the fact that the FBI Director “misspoke”
when he asserted during an oversight hearing that there is “a requirement of
‘suspicion of wrongdoing’ in order for the FBI to engage in surveillance of an
individual or location”).
136. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d) (2012) (imposing gag orders on entities
receiving requests for information from the FBI); 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b) (2012)
(allowing law enforcement to delay warrant notice requirements under certain
circumstances).
137. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) (2012) (exempting information that “would
disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or
prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or
prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk
circumvention of the law”).
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implemented. In some cases even the rules themselves are secret.
The publicly available version of the DIOG, for example, entirely
redacts the rules governing undisclosed participation in religious
or political gatherings.138
3. Intelligence Collection and Structural Constraints
The governance concerns posed by the FBI’s intelligencefocused mission and the lack of traditional oversight are
compounded by the FBI’s tendency to emphasize that mission
over other concerns. The Attorney General and the FBI are
responsible for incorporating two sometimes conflicting
responsibilities into intelligence-collection policies—terrorism
prevention and civil liberties protection.139 Given the incentives to
err on the side of security, the Guidelines risk short-changing
civil liberties concerns when the two missions conflict. The FBI
declares on its website that “[a]s an intelligence-driven and a
threat-focused national security organization with both
intelligence and law enforcement responsibilities,” its mission is
to “to protect and defend the United States against terrorist and
foreign intelligence threats, to uphold and enforce the criminal
laws of the United States, and to provide leadership and criminal
justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international
agencies and partners.”140 Similarly, the Bureau identifies as its
top priority protecting the United States from terrorist attack,
followed by combatting foreign intelligence operations,
cyberattacks, high-technology crimes, and public corruption.141

138. See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text. Even if these rules were
public, the majority often lacks incentive to object to problematic provisions
because much of the burden of intelligence collection falls on minority
communities. See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 88–179 (2003) (providing a
discussion of the historical pattern of dealing with threats to national security
by focusing on noncitizens with the rationale that they have diminished rights).
139. See supra Part II.A (discussing how the FBI’s policies affect the
prevention of terrorist attacks and protecting civil liberties).
140. Quick Facts, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/quick-facts (last visited
Oct. 20, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
141. Id.
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In other words, despite its location in the Department of
Justice and its law-enforcement responsibilities, the FBI is now
primarily a national security and intelligence-focused agency.142
In all of the FBI’s statements listing its goals and priorities,
protecting civil liberties falls far below protecting against
terrorist attacks and other security threats.143 Like the FBI’s
other statements of its priorities, the post-9/11 Guidelines
themselves present “[p]rotection of the United States and Its
people” as the goal that the FBI’s investigative authorities are
designed to further.144 And while the Guidelines have always
explicitly required investigators to use the least intrusive method
possible to achieve their investigative goals,145 as of 2002 the
Guidelines include a caveat: agents should not “hesitate to use
any lawful techniques consistent with these Guidelines, even if
intrusive,”146 where the degree of intrusiveness is warranted in
light of the seriousness of a threat, or in light of the importance of
foreign intelligence sought in the United States’ interests.147 This

142. See Hamed Aleaziz, Want to Sue the FBI for Spying on Your Mosque?
Sorry, That’s Secret,” MOTHER JONES (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.motherjones.
com/politics/2011/08/state-secrets-fazaga-v-fbi (last visited Nov. 13, 2013)
(quoting University of Texas Law Professor Bobby Chesney’s assertion that “[a]t
the end of the day, the FBI is part of the intelligence community as well—it’s
not necessarily thought of as any different than the NSA”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
143. See, e.g., Quick Facts, FBI, supra note 140 (listing civil rights protection
as fifth on the FBI’s list of priorities); Intelligence Overview, FBI
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/intelligence/intel-driven/intelligence-overview (last
visited Oct. 20, 2013) (discussing “safeguarding civil liberties” last on the
“Intelligence Overview” page) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
144. MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § I.C.1.
145. Until 2002, the Guidelines instructed that inquiries and investigations
should “be conducted with as little intrusion into the privacy of individuals as
the needs of the situation permit.” Memorandum from Charles Doyle, Sr.
Specialist, Am. Law Div., Cong. Research Serv., to Senate Select Comm. on
Intelligence 13 (Sept. 22, 2008) (citations omitted) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
146. ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 36, § I.
147. See id. (instructing agents to balance the importance of the information
sought with the intrusiveness of the techniques necessary).
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point is to be observed in particular, agents are instructed, in
investigations relating to terrorism.148
The DIOG presents even larger concerns on this front. Those
rules are devised and implemented within the FBI itself.149 Thus,
any nonsecurity perspective that Justice Department officials
may bring is absent from the DIOG. And because the terms of the
Guidelines are relatively skeletal, the FBI is left to fill in most of
the details itself. The DIOG does include hortatory language
regarding the need to be solicitous of civil liberties; to refrain
from infringing on First Amendment rights and from profiling on
the basis of race, religion, ethnicity, or national origin; and to
limit appropriately the scope and intrusiveness of FBI activity.150
It also instructs that “when First Amendment rights are at stake,
the choice and use of investigative methods should be focused in a
manner that minimizes potential infringement of those rights.”151
But after warning agents to take privacy, equal protection, and
First Amendment rights into account, the DIOG concludes by
reiterating that “FBI employees may use any lawful method
allowed, even if intrusive, where the intrusiveness is warranted
by the threat to the national security or to potential victims of
crime.”152
A recent quote from former Director of National Intelligence
Mike McConnell captures the sentiment of many security
policymakers. In his view, the American people have “very little
appreciation for the threat,” and “special interests, particularly
civil liberty groups with privacy concerns,” prevent the
intelligence community from doing its job as well as it otherwise
could.153 This view of the need to consider privacy concerns as a
148. See id. § I.C.2. (providing particular guidance relating to terrorism).
149. See DIOG, supra note 12, Preamble (“To assist the FBI in its mission,
the Attorney General signed [DIOG] on September 29, 2008. The primary
purpose of the [DIOG] is to standardize policy so that . . . investigative activities
are accomplished in a consistent manner.”).
150. See id. § 4.1.2 (barring the FBI from investigating solely to monitor the
exercise of constitutional rights, such as the free exercise of speech, religion,
assembly, press and petition” or based “solely on the race, ethnicity, national
origin or religious beliefs” of the subject).
151. Id. § 4.4.4.
152. Id. § 4.4.5.
153. Mark Mazzetti & Michael S. Schmidt, Ex-Worker at C.I.A. Says He
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hurdle to effective policy, rather than as an integral part of
policymaking, illustrates the tension that sometimes arises
between the FBI’s primary mission and its responsibility to
protect civil liberties. As others have pointed out, the FBI will
value success in carrying out its primary mission and will favor
terrorism prevention “over competing concerns such as the
protection of civil liberties.”154
Pointing out the elevation of the FBI’s anti-terrorism mission
over other considerations is not meant to be an indictment. That
mission is a vital one that should be pursued vigorously. And
with over a century of experience conducting criminal and
security investigations, the FBI is the agency in the best position
to determine the most effective means of pursuing that mission.
This includes decisions regarding which investigative methods
will be most successful in countering threats to the country. This
expertise should not be undervalued.
At the same time, the decision about what level of
intrusiveness society is prepared to accept in pursuit of security
is not a matter of technical, investigative, or intelligencecollection expertise. Determining the intrusiveness of an
investigation justified by any particular set of circumstances
necessarily
involves
normative
judgments
implicating
fundamental values. As should now be clear however, the only
true constraints on the FBI’s intelligence-collection activities are
the Guidelines and the DIOG. This leaves decisions regarding the
appropriate balance between the FBI’s security mission and the
interests on the other side of the scale in the hands of the
Attorney General. He, in turn, has delegated many of those
Leaked
Data
on
Surveillance,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
9,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/us/former-cia-worker-says-he-leaked-surveil
lance-data.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
154. Lininger, supra note 36, at 1267; see also Rory K. Little, Who Should
Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 418–23
(1996) (explaining the potential monetary and nonmonetary costs of a wholly
preemptive ethics code generated by the Attorney General); Fred C. Zacharias,
Who Can Best Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors, or, Who Should
Regulate the Regulators?: Response to Little, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 429, 449 (1996)
(“[T]he DOJ . . . is likely to allow institutional or membership interests to
dominate its substantive value choices.”).
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decisions to the FBI itself. Thus, concerns over security will have
a prominent role in such decision making and other interests will
be short-changed.
III. Administrative Strategies as Governance
If the usual tools of governance fail to apply effectively to the
Guidelines and the DIOG, how do we devise mechanisms to fill
this governance gap? This Part argues that we can borrow from
the institutional design principles of the administrative state to
address three specific challenges presented by the Guidelines
regime. First, the absence of both doctrinal and practical limits
on the FBI’s intelligence collection confers expansive discretion
on the Attorney General and the FBI. Second, the lack of judicial,
legislative, or public scrutiny of FBI policy results in a deficit of
both accountability and democratic legitimacy. And third, the
FBI’s focus on threat prevention creates a risk that its
rulemaking decisions will give insufficient attention to liberty
and privacy interests. With respect to each of these challenges,
this Part identifies strategies the administrative state employs,
and uses those strategies to develop concrete suggestions to
improve intelligence-collection governance.
This examination of administrative law strategies—designed
to channel discretion, increase accountability and legitimacy, and
ensure that competing priorities are afforded sufficient
attention—suggests the following concrete reform proposals.
First, a reason-giving framework should be implemented that
(1) requires the Attorney General to provide notice of his or her
intention to modify the Guidelines; and (2) specifies that any
modifications must be justified in writing.155 Second, to promote
meaningful pluralist input, the Attorney General should be
obligated to consider as part of the Guidelines-development
process the views of stakeholders outside the intelligence
community (though not necessarily outside the government).156
Third, in order to ensure liberty interests are not marginalized,
155.
156.

See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.C.
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(1) the Justice Department should be required to prepare a
statement indicating the likely impact on civil liberties of any
changes to the Guidelines, and (2) the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board should be empowered to participate
meaningfully in the Guidelines’ development.157 Before beginning
the analysis that suggests these particular reforms, however, a
few preliminary points are in order.
A. Preliminary Questions
This subpart will preemptively address several questions
raised by the discussion that follows. First, it acknowledges (and
rejects) concerns, based in political realities, that these proposals
can be no more than a thought exercise. Then it clarifies the role
that the Administrative Procedure Act plays in the argument,
and finally it recognizes that the addition of procedural
requirements may impose costs as well as benefits. With these
first-order questions addressed (if not entirely resolved), the
Article turns to the recommendations themselves.
First, some brief thoughts on political economy. This Article
aims to propose some plausible reforms in an area where what
Professor Heather Gerken calls the “here to there” problem is a
significant obstacle.158 Perhaps even more than in other policy
areas, expectations that Congress will act to implement these
recommendations—through legislation or through other available
levers of power—are likely to be disappointed. Indeed,
congressional oversight of national security policy has long been
considered ineffective by government officials, outside task forces,
and scholars.159 The dearth of public information about national
157. See infra Part III.D.
158. See Heather K. Gerken, Shortcuts to Reform, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1582,
1583–88 (2009) (discussing the difficulty of implementing reforms in the
election-administration context and proposing an information-forcing
mechanism as a possible catalyst).
159. See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 419–20 (2004) [hereinafter THE 9/11 COMM’N REPORT]
(finding widespread “dissatisfaction with congressional oversight”); AMY B.
ZEGART, EYES ON SPIES: CONGRESS AND THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY 31 (2011) (“[N]early all of [the former intelligence officials,
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security policy, which makes oversight significantly more
challenging, is partially to blame.160 But there are also perverse
incentives at work: legislators have no incentive to engage in
aggressive oversight of intelligence-collection powers.161
Legislators gain little by taking ownership over security policy.162
Meanwhile, so long as Congress can label such policies
“executive,” it cannot be blamed for intelligence failures.163 The
result is that all electoral incentives point toward congressional
deference to executive policy preferences in this area.164 This is
legislators, and legislative staff interviewed by author] complained that
oversight was nowhere close to meeting their expectations. And most believed
that oversight was consistently ineffective and getting more so.”); Vicki Divoll,
The “Full Access Doctrine”: Congress’s Constitutional Entitlement to National
Security Information from the Executive, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 493, 539–41
(2011) (arguing for intelligence oversight reform because “[f]orty years of
tweaking the [existing] statutes has not worked”); Loch K. Johnson, Ostriches,
Cheerleaders, Skeptics, and Guardians: Role Selection by Congressional
Intelligence Overseers, 28 SAIS REV. INT’L AFF. 93, 104–06 (2008) (calling on
members of Congress to exercise more diligent intelligence oversight).
160. See AMY ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JCS,
AND NSC 222–28 (1999) (“[I]t is difficult for interest groups to serve as low-cost
information providers.”); Rascoff, supra note 6, at 597 n.81 (noting fire alarm
oversight “typically depends on a public that is positioned to observe official
actors and to call attention to their potential abuses”); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Secrecy and Democracy: Who Controls Information in the National Security
State? 21–30 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 10-53, 2010) (describing challenges to congressional
oversight stemming from secrecy).
161. See Emily Berman, The Paradox of Counterterrorism Sunset Provisions,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1777, 1818–20 (2013) (explaining why the legislature is
strategically disadvantaged in national security matters compared with the
executive).
162. See id. at 1825–26 (“[L]egislators can derive scant electoral rewards
from associating themselves with particular counterterrorism policy . . . .”).
163. See id. at 1826 (“Since counterterrorism legislation provides small
upside value and enormous downside risk, legislators are best served,
electorally, by ensuring that any catastrophe cannot be laid at their feet through
voting in . . . a ‘pro-security’ direction.”).
164. See LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM: POWER,
POLITICS, AND LIBERTY 12 (2008) (noting that in both the United States and
Britain, legislators lacking full information about the nature and scope of the
threat will “err on the side of caution”); JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND
CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 92 (2012) (“Members [of
congressional intelligence committees] tend not to like responsibility for
national security decisions.”); MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL
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especially so for intelligence-collection policies imposing
disproportionate impact on certain segments of society, such as
minorities or noncitizens, whose interests carry little electoral
weight with legislators.165 Expectations that Congress will take
action in this area are thus likely to be disappointed.
And if Congress is so impotent with respect to the oversight
of the Guidelines, what would prompt either Congress or the
executive branch to impose the types of restrictions proposed
here? While I do not want to minimize the challenges of
prompting government actors to impose restrictions on domestic
security measures, opportunities for reform do arise. My hope is
to generate a menu of possible options, so that when such an
opportunity presents itself, it may be exploited.
These opportunities will likely arise out of one of two possible
exogenous events. First, there could be an event that triggers
widespread public concern about the FBI’s activities and places
sufficient pressure on Congress, or the Attorney General, or the
President that they have to take some action. After all, the
revelations about the activities of COINTELPRO are exactly
what brought the Attorney General’s Guidelines into existence.166
And the recent revelations regarding the NSA promise to prompt
a series of policy changes. The second possible event is a judicial
decision invalidating a particular FBI policy. Such a decision is
more likely to lead to modifications to particular practices—such
as we saw when a court rejected as unconstitutional the provision
that barred National Security Letter recipients from disclosing to
anyone that they had received one167—rather than to a broad
procedural framework. But like a scandal, judicial invalidation of
certain FBI activities could spur a broader reform effort.
ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR 58 (2004) (“[T]he political costs of underreaction are
always going to be higher than the costs of overreaction.”); ZEGART, supra note
160, at 35 (“What member would be willing to risk the charge that his oversight
efforts ended up weakening U.S. defense capabilities or jeopardizing American
national security interest?”); Berman, supra note 161, at 1825–26 (explaining
that legislators “have good reason” to defer to the executive on national security
matters).
165. See COLE, supra note 138, at 88–179 (providing examples).
166. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
167. See John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 876–81 (2d Cir. 2008)
(concluding the nondisclosure requirement could not survive strict scrutiny).
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Given the appropriate political environment, there are at
least three reasons to think that the imposition of a framework
like the one suggested here is not entirely implausible. As an
initial matter, there is the FBI’s concern over legitimacy. The
Bureau’s ability to succeed in its mission requires constructive
relationships with the communities in which it operates.168 Yet its
aggressive intelligence-collection tactics—and their concentration
in Muslim communities—has alienated many members of that
community, raised suspicion and distrust of the Bureau in some
quarters, and undermined cooperative relationships.169 Improved
governance is thus not the only benefit that would flow from
implementing APA-like procedures; institutionalizing rulemaking
procedures would also yield improvements in community
relations, public perceptions of legitimacy, and consequently, FBI
effectiveness. In addition, government documents and scholarly
commentary are replete with arguments about the value of
process in legitimating government action.170 The FBI’s practice
of reaching out to nongovernmental organizations in anticipation
of issuing new intelligence-collection rules indicates an
awareness of the benefits of generating the support of outside
stakeholders.171 Subjecting itself to a set of procedural rules
would go far in this regard. And finally, none of the proposals
here are substantive. They do not call upon the FBI to cede any
particular powers, or to discontinue existing policy. Indeed, they
acknowledge the Attorney General’s and FBI’s role in generating
the rules by which the FBI operates, so long as they can show
168. See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 32, at 34–35 (explaining the importance of
community-provided information in FBI counterterrorism efforts).
169. See, e.g., CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE, TARGETED &
ENTRAPPED: MANUFACTURING THE “HOMEGROWN THREAT” IN THE UNITED STATES
9–18 (2011) (describing some of the FBI’s post-9/11 information gathering tactics
that have attracted scrutiny and criticism).
170. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
FINAL BULLETIN FOR AGENCY GOOD GUIDANCE PRACTICES 15 (2007) [hereinafter
OMB BULL.] (“As it does for legislative rules, providing pre-adopting opportunity
for comment on significant guidance documents can increase the quality of the
guidance and provide for greater public confidence in and acceptance of the
ultimate agency judgments.”).
171. See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 32, at 43 n.286 (“The Justice Department
gave the illusion, though without any substance, of consultation with
stakeholders before implementing the current guidelines.”).
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both that changes in the FBI’s authority are needed and that the
proposed changes are reasonable ones. And finally, when it comes
to imposing limits on government actors, broad procedural
frameworks often face less opposition than substantive policy
changes.172
A second preliminary note concerns the role of the APA.
While several of the proposed reforms are inspired by provisions
of the APA, this Article does not argue that the APA’s procedural
rules apply to the FBI as a matter of binding law.173 In fact, it
does not take a position with respect to whether the Guidelines or
the DIOG constitute legislative rules subject to APA
requirements, or whether they represent informal guidance
documents or “rules of agency organization, procedure, or
practice,” which are explicitly exempt from many of the APA’s
constraints.174 Instead, the Article looks to the way the APA and
other sources of administrative law address particular concerns
and argues that intelligence-collection governance would benefit
from implementing procedures inspired the animating principles
behind these sources of administrative law.
The idea of imposing a governance framework on the
development of rules in the absence of a statutory requirement to
do so is not a novel one. The Office of Management and Budget
(OMB)—part of the Executive Office of the President tasked with
overseeing the regulatory decisions of administrative
agencies175—in its Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance
Practices “establishes policies and procedures for the
development, issuance, and use of significant guidance

172. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking
Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2323 (2006)
(“[S]ometimes broad design choices are easier to impose by fiat than are specific
policies.”).
173. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L. No. 79–404, 60 Stat. 237
(1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 500–706 (2012)).
174. 5 U.S.C. § (b)(3)(A) (2012); see also Rascoff, supra note 6, at 644–46
(comparing public participation in the formation of intelligence guidelines with
public participation in other agency guidelines).
175. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993)
(“Coordinated review of agency rulemaking is necessary . . . . The Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) shall carry out that review function.”).
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documents.”176 These policies are designed to increase the quality,
transparency, consistency, fairness, and accountability of agency
guidance practices.177 To that end, the Bulletin suggests that
agencies engage in “procedures similar to APA notice-andcomment requirements” for some types of guidance documents in
order to “increase the quality of the guidance and provide for
greater public confidence in and acceptance of the ultimate
agency judgments.”178 Similar language appears in the
Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) official guidance on
preparing Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs),179 which all
agencies—including the
FBI—must
generate
for
any
substantially revised or new Information Technology System that
collects, maintains, or disseminates personally identifiable
information from or about members of the public.180 According to
the DHS Guidance, requiring agencies to follow procedures
designed to call attention to issues of legitimacy “demonstrates to
the public and to Congress” that the new systems “have
consciously incorporated privacy protections.”181 In other words,
both OMB and DHS policy takes the position that procedural
constraints result in both better substantive rules and an
increase in the perceived legitimacy of those rules, even when
those constraints are self-imposed rather than statutorily
required.
A final preliminary note: implementing these reforms would
not be costless. As an initial matter, any increase in the
onerousness of modifying the Guidelines creates pressure to shift
176. OMB BULL., supra note 170, at 1.
177. See id. (“This Bulletin is intended to increase the quality and
transparency of agency guidance practices and the significant guidance
documents produced through them.”).
178. Id. at 15.
179. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENTS: THE
PRIVACY OFFICE OFFICIAL GUIDANCE 4 (2010) [hereinafter PIA GUIDANCE] (“The
PIA is a document that helps the public understand what information the
Department is collecting . . . . This document builds trust between the public
and the Department by increasing transparency of the Department’s systems
and goals.”).
180. See E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 208, 116 Stat.
2899, 2921–23 (codified in scattered sections of 44 U.S.C.).
181. PIA GUIDANCE, supra note 179, at 1.
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policy-making decisions to a level where these rules do not apply,
making accountability even more elusive. For this reason, any
efforts at reform would have to apply to changes to the DIOG as
well as the Guidelines, and consider ways to prevent further
devolution of decision-making responsibility. These suggested
changes would also, of course, consume time and personnel not
currently devoted to the Guidelines. But these costs need not be
prohibitive. As an initial matter, the costs themselves would
impose a potentially valuable barrier to arbitrary or unnecessary
changes. Only when changes are in fact necessary will the
Attorney General or FBI Director undertake the amendment
process. Moreover, the Guidelines and DIOG are modified so
infrequently that the need to allocate additional resources to the
project would be rare. If implemented effectively, these rare
additional costs would be justified by their benefits.
B. Reason-Giving as Constraint
Courts and commentators have raised a litany of reasons
why extending broad discretion to administrative agencies can be
problematic from a governance standpoint—reasons that apply
with equal force to the FBI’s exercise of intelligence-collection
powers. Agency strategy for channeling discretion, largely
dominated by reason-giving requirements, is therefore an
important source of ideas for addressing that concern in the
context of the Guidelines regime.
1. The Downsides of Discretion
Consigning significant policy choices to administrative
agencies operating with broad discretion undermines the
constitutional mechanism of promoting both accountability and
sound decision making. When it comes to legislation, the
Constitution seeks to avoid these concerns by subjecting
legislative decisions to the deliberation and contestation that
serves as a bulwark against faction and tyranny.182 Freed from
182.

See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 51 (James Madison) (describing how the
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the requirements of Article 1, § 7,183 however, agency decision
makers might engage in a wise and thoughtful decision-making
process; but they are equally capable of making poor choices,
opting for policies that are uninformed, arbitrary, irrational, selfinterested, or otherwise untethered to the public interest.184
Absent some alternative check on the way in which discretion is
exercised, there is therefore no reason to expect an agency’s
decision-making process to result in the best outcome—however
that is defined.
Similarly, because granting decision-making authority to
bureaucrats not subject to electoral forces that constrain other
policymakers removes those decisions from the field of political
battle, Congress both eludes responsibility for making difficult
policymaking decisions and insulates the policies themselves
from electoral backlash.185 Broad agency discretion thus
undermines the very nature of participatory democracy and
raises concerns about political accountability for critical decisions
of national policy.186
Constitution establishes a government conducive to liberty).
183. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2.
184. See Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 303, 336 (1999) (“[Congress’s] lawmaking power . . . is designed to ensure
the combination of deliberation and accountability that comes from saying that
government power cannot be brought to bear on individuals unless diverse
representatives, from diverse places, have managed to agree on the details.”).
185. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 543, 545–46 (2000) (“[D]espite their considerable discretionary power to
impact individual liberty and property rights, allocate benefits and burdens, and
shape virtually every sector of the economy, agencies are not directly
accountable to the electorate.”). But see Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and
Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 783–90
(1999) (outlining ways in which agencies are held democratically accountable).
186. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 487
(2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I believe that there are cases in which the
principle is intelligible and yet the significance of the delegated decision is
simply too great for the decision to be called anything other than ‘legislative.’”);
John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 426
n.23 (2005) (“Bicameralism and presentment form an essential component of the
constitutional structure, designed to check factional influence, promote caution
and deliberation, and provoke public discussion.”); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic
Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511,
1512 (1992) (“Over the past century, the powers and responsibilities of
administrative agencies have grown to an extent that calls into question the
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And while the Supreme Court’s decisions limiting legislative
delegations to agencies were confined to the New Deal-era,187 so
long as Congress sets down an “intelligible principle” for the
agency to follow,188 many of the procedural rules developed in the
administrative state serve to cabin discretion.189 Thus, while
agency decision makers continue to enjoy significant leeway, the
threat to democracy and accountability posed by agency
discretion has not gone unaddressed.
2. Channeling Discretion into Reasoned Decision-Making
The administrative state has grappled with legitimizing
broad delegations throughout its history.190 Over the years,
reasoned decision making emerged as an important means of
constitutional legitimacy of the modern federal bureaucracy.”); Richard B.
Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
437, 440 (2003) (“While application of the traditional model might ensure that
agencies acted within the bounds of their statutory powers, those bounds were
so wide as to give agencies vast discretionary powers, creating a palpable
democracy deficit and the threat of arbitrary power.”).
187. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542
(1935) (“We think that the code-making authority thus conferred is an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.”); Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935) (invalidating portions of federal legislation for
excessive delegation of authority to the executive).
188. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. at 472 (“[W]e repeatedly have said that
when Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies Congress must
‘lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body
authorized to [act] is directed to conform.’” (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v.
United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928))).
189. See Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116
YALE L.J. 952, 958 (2007) (arguing that Chenery’s requirement that an agency
provide an adequate basis for a rule “operates both to bolster the political
accountability of the agency’s action and to prevent arbitrariness in the agency’s
exercise of its discretion”). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation
Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000) (arguing that many judicial rules
regarding interpreting the scope of agency power are designed to address the
excessive delegation concern).
190. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 469–92 (2003)
(arguing that initial concerns about the administrative state’s role in the
constitutional structure focused, first and foremost, on the dangers of arbitrary
decision making and that such concerns have persisted).
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limiting discretion and improving the quality of agency
policymaking by requiring agencies to justify their actions.191 And
while these reason-giving requirements exist in part to facilitate
judicial review of agency action, they also have the intrinsic value
of promoting agency experts’ exercise of their discretion in a
thoughtful, principled fashion.192 These requirements come from
two sources: the Administrative Procedure Act193 supplemented
by the requirement from SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II)194
that agency actions are valid only if they can be upheld according
to the rationale given by the agency at the time the decision was
made.195
191. See, e.g., id. at 528 (noting the emergence of reasoned decision making
and the “hard look” doctrine); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in
Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1777–79 (2007) (summarizing
the history and rationale behind reasoned decision-making requirements in
administrative law); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1779–80 (1975) (describing judicial
insistence that agencies engage in reasoned decision making); see also INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951, 952 n.16 (1983) (noting that the Constitution itself
insists that legislation be subjected to deliberation and that the executive’s
discretion in carrying out legislative mandates is limited by the scope of the
legislative delegation).
192. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 41 (1983) (holding that the APA’s arbitrary and capricious test requires
reasoned decision making); see also, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517
U.S. 735, 741 (1996) (“[W]e have before us here a full-dress regulation, issued by
the Comptroller himself and adopted pursuant to the notice-and-comment
procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act designed to assure due
deliberation . . . .”); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the
Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 79 nn.226–27 (1998) (noting that
the APA facilitates deliberative agency decisions); Stewart, supra note 191, at
1670 (noting that APA procedures are “designed to promote the accuracy,
rationality, and reviewability of agency application of legislative directives”);
Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29,
60–61 (1985) (“Much of modern administrative law is a means of serving the
original purposes of the nondelegation doctrine, and of promoting Madisonian
goals, without invalidating regulatory statutes or relying on traditional
conceptions of private property.”).
193. See Administrative Procedure Act, § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012)
(explaining the notice-and-comment requirements of rulemaking under the
APA).
194. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
195. See id. at 196 (“[A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or
judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must
judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the
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The APA procedures for informal rulemaking employ two
strategies for ensuring that agencies can engage in a process of
reasoned decision making.196 First, the APA has a notice
requirement, which is designed to broaden the range of
information and perspectives the agency must take into
account197 in order to promote more informed decision making.198
To ensure these goals are met, the APA demands that an agency’s
notice must “fairly apprise interested persons of the subjects and
issues” at stake whenever they intend to engage in a
rulemaking199 and indicate the rulemaking’s legal and factual
basis as well as its policy purpose.200 Thus, the APA aims to
ensure that agencies have before them all relevant information
when making policy decisions.
The second element of the APA’s strategy for channeling
discretion is the obligation that agencies issue a public statement
when announcing a final rule.201 Just as written judicial opinions
demonstrate that a court’s decision is supported by facts, law, and
agency.”); Stack, supra note 189, at 956 (“The [Chenery] principle now applies in
review of every form of agency action, from agency rulemaking to informal
adjudication, as well as in review of all manner of deficiencies in agency factfinding and insufficient statements of reasons . . . .”).
196. The APA lays down procedures for two forms of agency action,
rulemaking and adjudication, each of which may be pursued through either
formal or informal proceedings. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554, 556, 557.
197. See Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506,
547 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“[N]otice improves the quality of agency rulemaking by
ensuring that agency regulations will be ‘tested by exposure to diverse public
comment.’” (quoting BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 641 (1st
Cir. 1979))).
198. Id.; Conn. Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 528 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (“The process of notice and comment rulemaking is . . . to be a process of
reasoned decision-making.”).
199. NRDC v. EPA, 279 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2002).
200. Administrative Procedure Act, § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); see also
United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251–52 (2d Cir.
1977) (noting that scientific data used in an agency’s rulemaking analysis
should be disclosed during the notice process); Portland Cement Ass’n v.
Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“It is not consonant with the
purpose of a rule-making proceeding to promulgate rules on the basis of . . .
data . . . known only to the agency.”).
201. See id. § 553(c) (“After consideration of the relevant matter presented,
the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of
their basis and purpose.”).
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precedent, these statements of purpose serve to demonstrate that
agency officials considered all of the information before them and
engaged in a “process of reasoned decision-making.”202 To that
end, the statement must include the rule’s basis and purpose as
well as a justification of the decisions that led to its adoption, and
it must “indicate the major issues of policy that were raised in the
proceedings and explain why the agency decided to respond to
these issues as it did.”203 Moreover, under Chenery II, only if the
purpose provided by the agency constitutes a valid justification
for the decision will it be legitimate.204
Rules should similarly dictate that the Attorney General or
FBI Director provide notice explaining the reasons for any
proposed changes to the Guidelines or the DIOG and a
justification for the ultimate decisions that demonstrates that all
of the relevant available information was taken into
consideration and that there was a valid basis for the change. The
distinctions between traditional administrative law and national
security administration require, however, some adjustments to
the usual procedural design. While most agency notices of
proposed rulemaking are part of the public record and freely
available for wide dissemination, the classified nature of much of
the FBI’s activity and some of the rules contained in the DIOG
requires that the dissemination of the notice and justification will
often be limited to individuals with the necessary security
clearance.205 Imagine, for example, a proposed rule-change
designed to modify surveillance operations to make them less
likely to be detected by the target. Publicizing that intention and
202. Conn. Light & Power Co., 673 F.2d at 528.
203. Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847, 852
(D.C. Cir. 1987); see also S. REP. NO. 752-79, pt. IV(4)(b) (1945) (“The required
statement of the basis and purpose of rules issued should not only relate to the
data so presented but with reasonable fullness explain the actual basis and
objectives of the rule.”).
204. See Stack, supra note 189, at 956 (“The Chenery principle makes the
validity of agency action depend upon the validity of contemporaneous agency
reason-giving.”).
205. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2012) (exempting from public disclosure
obligations records or information that could reasonably disclose confidential
sources, law enforcement procedures or techniques, or lead to circumvention of
the law).
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the resulting rule might undermine entirely the purpose of the
revision.
While the effect of limited dissemination of notice and
justification will not be as robust as a process that is entirely
transparent, limits on dissemination need not render written
notice and justification worthless. In addressing concerns over
excessive discretion, the crucial elements of the relevant
administrative strategy are (1) that the notice broaden the range
of information and perspectives that the agency considers and
(2) that the written justification demonstrates that the agency’s
decision enjoys sufficient factual and legal support. To accomplish
this, the notice and justification must go to individuals or entities
whose participation would serve to expand the information and
perspectives available to the decision makers and whose scrutiny
of the ultimate justification would encourage the adoption of rules
supported by reasoned argument and available evidence.
Candidates to receive this notice and justification are both
inside and outside the Justice Department. The Justice
Department’s Civil Rights Division and Office of Privacy and
Civil Liberties as well as the National Security Division could be
invited to comment. Similarly, other members of the intelligence
community, such as the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence should be involved. But the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) should contribute its
perspective as well. This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of
possibilities. Nor will each of these institutions necessarily take
on the role of civil-liberties champion or do so effectively.206 For
now, it is enough to say that so long as they have access to the
relevant information and bring a perspective different from the
one within the Attorney General’s office or the FBI, their
participation would help to channel discretion in a productive
direction.
The 2008 modifications to the Guidelines provide a concrete
example of how the requirement that the Attorney General
provide reasons justifying amendments could impact the process.
206. Neither the Justice Department’s Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties
nor the Civil Rights Division have been particularly successful in counteracting
the policy preferences of the FBI.

56

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2014)

One proffered justification for amending the Guidelines in 2008
was that they were necessary to provide tools the FBI needed to
support its preventive role.207 But the then-existing Guidelines
already described prevention as the FBI’s “central mission,” and
included several provisions added in 2002 that were aimed at
empowering and enabling this aspect of the FBI’s activities.208 In
asserting that the 2008 Guidelines were necessary for terrorism
prevention, the Bureau had no obligation to explain how its
activities were unacceptably constrained by the rules that were
then in effect, which were drafted for the same purpose.209 Under
these proposed rules, the Attorney General would have had to
make that case, allowing those entities that were notified the
opportunity to question the need for changes and possibly even
make those concerns public.210 And if the Attorney General could
not do so satisfactorily, it would have made altering the
Guidelines a much more controversial proposition.
Requiring written justification of the final rules also might
have had an impact on the 2008 revisions. On the one hand, the
Justice Department downplayed the extent to which the
Guidelines expanded the FBI’s powers. The new Guidelines were
characterized as merely consolidating several existing sets of
rules without making substantive changes.211 In fact, Justice
Department officials asserted that assessments were nothing
207. See Mukasey Speech, supra note 83 (explaining how the new Attorney
General Guidelines would help to transform the FBI into an “elite national
security organization” by shifting focus from “investigating crimes after they
occur to collecting the intelligence necessary to detect and prevent attacks
before they occur”).
208. ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 36, at 11.
209. See supra Part II.B.
210. See supra Part III.B.
211. See Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 8 (2008) (statement of Robert S.
Mueller, Director, FBI) (“[T]he new guidelines are not designed to give the FBI
any broad new authorities.”); Mukasey Speech, supra note 83 (“The new
consolidated guidelines will, in short, integrate more completely and harmonize
the standards that apply to the FBI’s activities.”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Briefing with Department Officials on Consolidated Attorney General
Guidelines (Sept. 12, 2008) [hereinafter DOJ Briefing] (“[O]n the national
security side, it was a new concept to have what were called ‘threat
assessments . . . . That was new in 2003; this is not anything different now.”).
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new, and that under the pre-2008 Guidelines it could already
conduct assessments using pretext interviews, physical
surveillance, and the tasking of informants.212 But there was no
“assessment” level in the pre-2008 Guidelines.213 Indeed, they
explicitly prohibited both pretext interviews and physical
surveillance until a preliminary inquiry—a predicated
investigation—had been opened.214 “Threat assessments” were
permitted in some contexts under the 2003 National Security
Investigation Guidelines, but by the FBI’s own admission, some
of the techniques available in today’s assessments were
prohibited in that context.215 Had the Attorney General or FBI
Director been required to explain exactly what changes were
being made and provide the rationale for the new rules, the
creation of assessments in their current form—the central
innovation of the 2008 Guidelines—might have met with more
resistance. In particular, the ways in which assessments
expanded the FBI’s powers, for example permitting use of several
investigative techniques historically reserved for predicated
investigations, would have become clear and consequently would
have been subject to closer examination. As it was, the Attorney
General could simply disclaim the idea that new powers were
being granted without having to substantiate that statement.
212.

See DOJ Briefing, supra note 211
And the changed techniques are the physical surveillance, which
had been available if you were investigating under general
crimes, but not under national security; recruiting and tasking
of sources, which again had been available if it was general
crimes, but not national security; and then the pretext
interviews.
213. Cf. id. (“[T]he decision was reached in 2003 that there needed to be
some level of activity before a formal investigation [to] allow the FBI to be
proactive. . . . What has changed are some of the techniques that are available
in the assessment level.”).
214. See ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 36, § II.B.6 (listing those
investigative techniques available “without any prior authorization from a
supervisory agent”).
215. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR FBI
NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
§ II.A (2003), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/nsiguidelines.pdf (listing
activities available at the threat assessment stage without opening an
investigation, not including pretext interviews or physical surveillance).
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In addition to any substantive differences to the 2008
Guidelines that would have resulted, a notice and justification
requirement would have provided other concrete benefits. First, it
would have guaranteed that decision makers had the benefit of
additional perspectives while they were still developing the
policy. It is much easier—and therefore more likely—for
policymakers to incorporate alternative perspectives into policy
still being developed than once that policy is nearing its final
form.216 Second, obligating the Attorney General to address the
information that was submitted to him and to explain in writing
why the Guidelines should be implemented in his chosen format
would force him to digest that information and therefore might
actually result in a more informed decision.217 Third, it would
have added additional legitimacy to the final product if218 the
2008 Guidelines development had been based on specific,
reasoned arguments regarding the need for modifications.
C. Participatory Policymaking
Nowhere does the Constitution provide for the existence of
administrative agencies, much less for specific means of ensuring
that their actions do not infringe on fundamental rights or that
they are subject to democratic accountability.219 The
administrative state has grappled with this “democracy deficit”
almost since its inception.220 One means employed to address it
has been through increasing opportunities for broad participation
in agency decision making. Designing ways to employ these
216. See Bressman, supra note 190, at 542 (explaining that notice-andcomment rulemaking facilitates prospective policymaking including broader
perspectives).
217. See supra notes 190–92 and accompanying text.
218. See Bressman, supra note 190, at 542–43 (arguing that notice-andcomment rulemaking leads to a decrease in arbitrariness because of the input
from affected parties).
219. See id. at 462 (describing the struggle to reconcile the administrative
state with our constitutional structure).
220. See id. (explaining the constant attempt to square the administrative
state with a constitutional structure that presumes the accountability of
policymakers).
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strategies for increased participation could lend increased
democratic legitimacy to the intelligence-collection realm.
1. Administrative Agencies’ Democracy Deficit
Administrative agencies initially were viewed either as
entities merely implementing congressional will or as bastions of
expertise, making decisions on the basis of scientific or technical
knowledge.221 By the latter half of the twentieth century,
however, it had become clear that many congressional
delegations are vague and that many agency decisions cannot be
resolved definitively through substantive expertise.222 Instead,
such decisions often rest on subjective judgments about policy
priorities, the value of human well-being, and who should bear
the costs of inevitable risks. The Guidelines are thus not alone in
their undemocratic nature. This democracy deficit “has spawned
an extensive literature concerning the legitimacy of the
administrative state.”223 Indeed, Professor Jody Freeman has
suggested that “[a]dministrative law scholarship has organized
itself largely around the need to defend the administrative state
against accusations of illegitimacy”224 based on the
unaccountability of agency officials, a lack of transparency, and
limited opportunities for public participation.225
221. See id. at 470–74 (explaining the early models of administrative
agencies); Stewart, supra note 186, at 1671–75 (discussing “the Traditional
Model” of American administrative law); United States v. Nova Scotia Food
Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251–52 (2d Cir. 1977) (discussing the role of
scientific data in an agency’s rulemaking analysis).
222. See Stewart, supra note 186, at 440–41 (discussing the New Deal
regulatory regime which led to the enactment of the Administrative Procedure
Act).
223. David L. Markell, Understanding Citizen Perspectives on Government
Decision Making Processes as a Way to Improve the Administrative State, 36
ENVTL. L. 651, 653 (2006).
224. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 543, 546 (2000).
225. See, e.g., Croley, supra note 192, at 27 (describing the administrative
process as the “proverbial black box that mysteriously translates legislative
inputs into regulatory outcomes”); id. at 97 (asserting that the administrative
state does not “encourage widespread participation”).
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2. Increasing Democracy, Increasing Participation

One answer to the democracy deficit implemented by the
administrative state has been to boost the democratic pedigree of
agency rules by insisting on broad participation.226 A variety of
procedural and doctrinal rules in the administrative state
promote the broad participation of interested stakeholders. As
with limits on discretion, the informal rulemaking process set out
in the APA promotes participation through the implementation of
strategies that can help improve the democratic pedigree of the
Guidelines and the DIOG.
The first element of the strategy for improved democratic
legitimacy is that the notice of proposed rulemaking itself must
be provided in such a way as to facilitate meaningful
participation,227 such as including the legal and factual basis for
the proposed rule228 and the data on which the agency relied in
making its proposal.229 These mandates ensure that stakeholders
who want to participate have enough information to permit them
to raise objections, provide additional information, or offer
alternative perspectives. The notice, therefore, not only alerts
diverse interested parties that there is a decision being
contemplated for which they might want to provide input, but
also ensures that input can be meaningful. Second, the agency
must actually consider this input. A final rule’s statement of
basis and purpose must “indicate the major issues of policy that
226. See Stewart, supra note 186, at 444 (stating that various methods of
“[p]ublic participation . . . have become central foundations of administrative
law and practice”); Schuck, supra note 185, at 781 (“Today, the administrative
agency is often the site where public participation in lawmaking is most
accessible, most meaningful, and most effective.”).
227. See Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506,
552 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (defining a situation where the EPA’s regulations were
struck down by the court because the notice of proposed rulemaking was
insufficient to put the public fully on notice).
228. See NRDC v. EPA, 279 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that an
agency must give notice to apprise interested parties of the “subjects and issues
before the Agency”).
229. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods., Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251–
52 (2d Cir. 1977) (explaining that an agency that promulgates a rule based on
scientific data must make that data available to the public during the comment
period).
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were raised in the proceedings and explain why the agency
decided to respond to these issues as it did.”230 Thus any failure to
take into account relevant comments can invalidate the rule. This
risk of invalidation discourages the development of rules that do
not take all relevant perspectives into consideration.231
Again, these requirements will also result in rules that enjoy
more democratic legitimacy than a rule prepared without such
input. Affected parties are more likely to view agency decisions as
legitimate if the process provides for a meaningful opportunity for
presentation and consideration of their views. And if the rules are
considered legitimate, the FBI will be much more likely to enjoy
the full support and cooperation of the communities it is policing,
leading to more effective intelligence collection.
Devising rulemaking mechanisms that are inclusive and
allow for meaningful input from interested stakeholders presents
a challenge when it comes to the domestic-intelligence regime
because secrecy presents a formidable barrier to inclusion.232
Even with respect to rules that are themselves public, such as the
Guidelines, robust public participation in the process is
impractical because there is insufficient public information about
how those rules are implemented. The public may know, for
example, that FBI agents are permitted to attend any religious
service that is open to the public.233 But it will not know how
230. Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847, 852 (D.C. Cir.
1987); see also S. DOC. NO. 79-248, at 20 (2d Sess. 1946) (“The statement of the
‘basis and purpose’ of rules . . . should be fully explanatory of the complete
factual and legal basis as well as the object or objects sought.”).
231. See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and
Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 489 (1999) (discussing
how the rulemaking process allows individuals to advance perspectives while
others scrutinize those perspectives); see also Conn. Light & Power Co. v. NRC,
673 F.2d 525, 528 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“One particularly important component of
the reasoning process [in rulemaking] is the opportunity for interested parties to
participate in a meaningful way. . . .”).
232. See, e.g., Kerry E. Rodgers, The Limits of Collaborative Governance:
Homeland Security and Environmental Protection at U.S. Ports, 25 VA. ENVT’L.
L.J. 157, 160–65 (2007) (noting secrecy of policy, lack of publicly available
information, and difficulty in identifying stakeholders as barriers to
collaborative governance in the security context).
233. See DIOG, supra note 12, § 4.2.2 (explaining that the FBI may
investigate activities or persons so long as it does not infringe on the free
exercise of religion guaranteed in the First Amendment).
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often agents engage in this activity, what information they
collect, or what is done with the information. Rules that are
themselves secret, such as portions of the DIOG, present an even
more formidable challenge. To be sure, a strong case can be made
that the existing levels of secrecy—with respect to both the rules
and the policy implementation—are excessive.234 Unless and until
that secrecy is reduced, however, intelligence-collection policies
will struggle to gain the benefits that inhere in broadly inclusive
agency rulemaking.
Yet, the Justice Department clearly hopes to realize at least
some of the benefits of democratic input when it comes to the
Guidelines. Recall the Department’s 2008 briefing of relevant
congressional committees and other interested parties prior to
the Guidelines’ adoption.235 The Bureau did the same thing in
2001 when it revised the DIOG.236 These meetings allowed the
FBI to characterize these documents as rules developed with
input from an array of stakeholders and thus deserving of the
enhanced legitimacy that broad participation confers.237 So even
if the consultations themselves failed to result in meaningful
participation beyond the Justice Department,238 they indicate
recognition that agency decision makers desire (at least the
appearance of) an inclusive process.
The benefits of participatory decision making require a more
robust process than the one undertaken in 2008. Recognizing that
234. See Steven Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What
Works, 27 YALE L. POL’Y REV. 399, 415–16 (describing the legitimacy of “national
security secrecy” and problems of “bureaucratic secrecy”).
235. See DOJ Briefing, supra note 211 (describing the way in which the FBI
and DOJ included relevant congressional committees in discussions about
consolidating the multiple sets of guidelines into one).
236. See Rascoff, supra note 6, at 644–48 (explaining that the FBI consulted
various groups before the new Attorney General’s Guidelines were issued);
Savage, supra note 89 (noting that the FBI consulted the ACLU about the new
Guidelines prior to their issuance).
237. Supra note 236 and accompanying text; see Elisebeth Collins Cook,
Assistant Attorney Gen. & Valerie Caproni, FBI Gen. Counsel, Joint Statement
to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: New Attorney General
Guidelines
for
Domestic
Intelligence
(Sept.
23,
2008),
http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/ag-domestic-intel-guidelines.pdf (discussing the
revisions).
238. See infra notes 329–30.
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the public at large will not be able to play a meaningful role, a
second-best measure is to seek out proxies for points of view
currently not formally represented in the process of developing
the Guidelines and the DIOG. An example comes from Professors
DeShazo and Freeman’s empirical case study of the licensing
practices of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.239 In the
amended Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986,240 “Congress
[required the Commission] to consult with fish and wildlife
agencies prior to issuing licenses [and demanded] that
nondevelopmental values be given ‘equal consideration’ with
power concerns.”241 DeShazo and Freeman explain that this
amendment was specifically intended to strengthen the role of
resource agencies in the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission’s decision-making process242 and that it did in fact
have the desired effect.243
239. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 2217, 2221 (2005) (“We argue . . . agencies can be prompted to
take their secondary missions more seriously when Congress enhances
interagency lobbying by increasing the power of other agencies, which derive
relevant expertise and interests from their own statutory mandates, to lobby the
implementing agency.” (emphasis added)); Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do:
How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVT’L L.
REV. 1, 5–6 (2009) (suggesting that in DeShazo & Freeman’s model,“the impact
of the comments will be based primarily on their persuasiveness or political
import, and on the pressure they may place on the decision-making agency to
develop better measures of performance on secondary goals”).
240. Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-495, 100
Stat. 1243 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 7977b, 823b (2012)).
241. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 239, at 2253.
242. The Electric Consumers Protection Act (ECPA) required the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), rather than the license applicant, to
consult with state and federal resource agencies before submitting their
applications to FERC, required that FERC establish a dispute resolution
process to mediate its disagreements with other agencies, demanded that FERC
provide an explanation whenever it chose not to implement the
recommendations of other agencies, and forced FERC to engage in monitoring to
ensure that dam operators complied with any imposed environmental
conditions. See id. at 2225–26 (explaining the added obligations placed on the
FERC by the ECPA).
243. See id. at 2226–27, 2275–80, 2289 (discussing the purpose and effect of
the amendment); Biber, supra note 239, at 43
DeShazo and Freeman show through statistical analysis that, after
the passage of the statutory changes, FERC consistently imposed
more environmental conditions on the approval or renewal of dam
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A procedural regime governing the Guidelines’ development
could similarly mandate the participation of particular entities
that will bring alternative perspectives to the discussion. Each of
the entities noted as a potential recipient of notice and source of
information could play this role. One especially promising
candidate for this role is the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board (PCLOB), a statutorily created independent
agency charged with ensuring that privacy and civil liberties
concerns are considered in the development and implementation
of laws, regulations, and policies related to terrorism.244 The
PCLOB took several years to get off the ground.245 In the wake of
recent revelations regarding NSA surveillance, however, it has
demonstrated its ability to participate in the surveillance-policy
conversation by insisting on a classified briefing about the
controversial surveillance programs, meeting with the
President,246 holding a public hearing seeking concrete
suggestions for improving the civil liberties protections included
as part of those programs.247 Based in part on what members of
the Board learned at that meeting, the PCLOB issued a detailed
report recommending specific changes to one existing surveillance
program and anticipates issuing similar reports about other
programs.248 Whether any of the PCLOB’s recommendations will
licenses, and that this is correlated with increased participation in
FERC licensing programs by fish and wildlife agencies.
244. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2012) (establishing the PCLOB and mandating
that it “review proposed legislation, regulations, and policies related to efforts to
protect the Nation from terrorism”).
245. See Phillip Alston, The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders, 2
HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 283, 383 & nn.352–53 (2011) (explaining that the PCLOB
was established under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 but became independent in 2007 by the Implementing Recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission Act).
246. See Privacy & Civil Liberties Oversight Bd., Statement (June 20, 2013)
(thanking the President for meeting with the board and for providing briefings)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
247. See generally PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., WORKSHOP
REGARDING SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 215 OF
THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT (2013), http://www.pclob.gov/All%20Documents/July%209,
%202013%20Workshop%20Transcript.pdf (seeking suggestions about how to
protect civil liberties in light of NSA surveillance programs).
248. See PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE
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be adopted remains to be seen. But giving the Board an official
role in the process in which the Guidelines and the DIOG are
formulated would ensure that the civil liberties point of view is
represented.
This participation could take one of several forms, ranging
from an opportunity to express views to veto power.249 If the
requirement is modeled on the concept behind the participation
requirements included in notice-and-comment rulemaking, then
it will end up somewhere between these two extremes, with
something like the following arrangement: The PCLOB would
have the opportunity to submit its perspective; having received
this input, the Attorney General or the FBI Director would be
required to demonstrate that it was taken into consideration.
Finding ways to broaden the perspectives involved when it
comes to the DIOG is particularly important. Currently, nobody
outside the FBI must be involved. Ensuring that alternative
perspectives are voiced and requiring that the final rules reflect,
or explain why they fail to reflect, these perspectives may provide
some of the benefits of the multilateral, deliberative process that
truly pluralist rulemaking procedures promote.250

TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA
PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE COURT (2013), http://www.pclob.gov/SiteAssets/Pages/default/
PCLOB-Report-on-the-Telephone-Records-Program.pdf (analyzing the NSA’s
telephony metadata collection program and making twelve recommendations for
reform); Alston, supra note 245, at 383 (explaining that the PCLOB’s task is “to
scrutinize privacy and civil liberties issues raised by national security policies
and programs”).
249. See generally Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without
Authority in Federal Agencies (U. Mich. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 353,
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2322797
(describing various mechanisms used in the administrative state to infuse
agency action with a particular desired value or viewpoint).
250. Any entities involved in decision making regarding the Guidelines’ or
DIOG’s contents also should be entitled to suggest a change to the rules in the
same way that the public has the right to petition an agency to issue, modify, or
rescind a rule. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012) (providing this right).
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D. Reconciling Conflicting Missions

Administrative governance also has developed ways to
address the challenges posed when agencies are responsible for
pursuing multiple, competing goals. The FBI must carry out its
mission of preventing security threats from manifesting while
simultaneously protecting fundamental rights. The principles
behind the administrative state’s tactics for reconciling
conflicting missions offer ideas about how to implement
structural checks to prevent the FBI’s intelligence-collection
mission from overwhelming these other important interests.
1. Juggling Mandates
Conflict among agency missions comes about when one or
more statutes issue mandates to a single agency that come into
tension with one another or when government-wide mandates
conflict with the primary goals of individual agencies subject to
those mandates.251 In one example, the National Park Service
must protect the natural resources of the parks while
simultaneously developing facilities for visitors.252 Similarly, the
Fish and Wildlife Service is required to manage wildlife refuges
for the conservation of plants and animals while also providing
for recreation on those refuges.253 And the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)254 requires “all federal
agencies” to minimize the environmental impacts of their
actions.255 For an agency focused on, for example, building roads
251. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 239, at 2220 (“Congress can create the
potential for interstatutory conflicts where the agency must balance multiple
and potentially competing obligations arising from different statutes usually
passed at different times by different enacting majorities.”).
252. See Biber, supra note 239, at 7–8 (pointing out that 16 U.S.C. § 1 and
§ 668dd(a)(2)-(3)(B) mandate that the Park Service and the Fish and Wildlife
Service both conserve and allow for “compatible wildlife-dependent recreation”).
253. Id. at 7.
254. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, §§ 2–209, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321–4347 (2012).
255. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(B), which requires all federal agencies
to consider “unquantified environmental amenities and values” along with
“economic and technical considerations,” and § 4332(C), which requires federal
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through environmentally sensitive territory, the charge to protect
the environment can be at odds with this focus.
The FBI’s mandate to protect civil liberties can be viewed as
a “secondary” mission—one that frequently comes into tension
with its primary mission of preventing security threats.256
Studies show that an agency will focus on what it considers to be
its primary mission, and it will shirk on performing “secondary”
or less easily evaluated goals.257 As a secondary mission,
protection of civil liberties is, therefore, sure to be short-changed
in favor of security in the same way that environmental concerns
have so often gone under-addressed in favor of development or
other economically profitable activities.
2. Relieving the Tension Among Multiple Missions
Fortunately, several administrative law strategies suggest
ways to ensure that the Guidelines regime sufficiently takes into
account civil liberties concerns as well as security concerns.258
Though all of the options discussed below are possible paths to
follow, the final two approaches discussed below seem
particularly promising.
Congress Reclaims Authority. One option, of course, is for
Congress simply to relieve an agency of responsibility for one of
agencies to develop environmental impact statements for all major federal
actions).
256. See id. at 3 (explaining the problem of multiple-goal agencies and the
inevitability that these goals will conflict with each other).
257. See id. at 9 (citing studies and “predict[ing] that agencies faced with
conflicting tasks will systematically overperform on the tasks that are easier to
measure and have higher incentives, and underperform on the tasks that are
harder to measure and have lower incentives.”).
258. See generally Biber, supra note 239 (discussing various strategies
agencies use to meet both primary goals and secondary goals). Other
commentators have addressed the issue from a more specific angle. See, e.g.,
DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 239, at 2253 (discussing efforts to ensure that
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission took environmental concerns into
account when making licensing decisions); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional
Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61
STAN. L. REV. 869, 869 (2009) (discussing the challenges that arise because
prosecutors have the dual role of making both charging and adjudicatory
decisions).
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the competing goals, reclaiming that decision-making authority
for itself.259 Following revelations of civil liberties violations in
the 1970s, Congress reclaimed some decision-making authority
regarding the executive’s surveillance powers by enacting the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).260 Or Congress
could generate more piecemeal limitations, barring particular
techniques that pose threats to civil liberties, or defining the
circumstances under which such techniques could be used.
Congress could, for example, statutorily reinstate the rule
regarding the use of undercover agents to investigate First
Amendment protected activities as it existed in the Guidelines in
2001, which required that the FBI have probable cause or a
reason to believe a crime had been committed before sending an
agent into the meetings of a religious or political group.261
Congress need not legislate to bring such changes about. If
Congress wanted to alter particular investigative tactics, or even
to pressure the Justice Department to adopt of its own volition
the type of procedural framework suggested in this Article, it has
an array of tools at its disposal to press for its desired policy
change. Just the threat of legislation, so long as it is credible, can
spur executive action. Recall that the original Attorney General’s
Guidelines were implemented to sap the momentum from
Congress’s efforts to enact a legislative charter for the FBI.262 So
long as the option of enacting an FBI charter remains a viable
means for Congress to limit the Attorney General’s discretion
when it comes to FBI investigations, the threat of such legislation
can be used to press for Congress’s desired policy outcomes.
Congress possesses carrots as well as sticks—its control over the
FBI and Justice Department’s budget also can impose a great
259. See Biber, supra note 239, at 32–33 (describing the Wilderness Act,
which eliminated several land-management agencies’ power to create or
eliminate wilderness areas).
260. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–511, 92
Stat. 1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
261. See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS 5 (2002)
(discussing when the FBI may use undercover agents to investigate a religious
organization).
262. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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deal of pressure for policy change. Given the political economy of
this policy area,263 however, reliance on Congress to reconcile the
tension between the FBI’s security mission and civil liberties is
not the most promising route.
Separate Agency Functions. Another way that the
administrative state deals with competing mandates is to
separate agency functions, assigning one mandate to another
(new or pre-existing) agency and leaving each free to focus solely
on its own particular mandate. The APA’s requirement that
investigative and adjudicative functions be separated from one
another, thereby insulating some decision making from possibly
biased influences,264 is a way to implement this division-offunctions idea within a single agency. Professor Rachel Barkow
has advocated, for example, for the separation of adjudicative and
enforcement functions within prosecutors’ offices.265 And in the
domestic investigative context, the United Kingdom offers an
illustration. Rather than relying on one agency both to enforce
criminal laws and to collect intelligence, those functions are
divided between two different agencies.266 The police forces
investigate crimes and enforce criminal law, and MI5 collects
intelligence.267 Some commentators have argued that the United
States should consider more closely the idea of spinning off the
FBI’s intelligence-collection function into an independent
agency.268 This alone would not, of course, address many of the
concerns that the FBI’s current powers raise. But it is possible
that, recognizing the special threats to civil liberties that
263. See supra notes 125–35 and accompanying text.
264. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012).
265. See Barkow, supra note 258, at 874 (“The problems posed by federal
prosecutors’ combination of adjudicative and enforcement functions are the very
same issues raised by the administrative state—and the solutions fit equally
well in both settings.”).
266. See Jodie A. Kirshner, U.S. and U.K. Approaches to the War on Terror:
The Surveillance of Religious Worship, 14 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 217,
232–33 (2006) (explaining MI5’s authority to function solely as an intelligence
agency).
267. Id.
268. See RICHARD POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS: INTELLIGENCE
REFORM IN THE WAKE OF 9/11 172–97 (2005) (discussing the potential benefits
and risks of a domestic intelligence agency).
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intelligence collection poses, an agency designed solely for that
purpose would be subjected to more stringent limits. Indeed, to
prevent overreaching, MI5’s expansive intelligence-collection
powers do not include arrest or detention authority.269 Thus
powers that are necessary for successful anti-crime efforts could
nonetheless be off-limits or curtailed for the intelligence agency.
This division-of-functions solution, whether within or
between agencies, is also unlikely to garner much support in the
Guidelines context. As an initial matter, congressional passivity
with respect to intelligence oversight will undermine any
legislative efforts in this direction. But more importantly, many
of the reforms to the intelligence community’s structure in the
past decade-plus have been explicitly designed to consolidate,
rather than separate, functions. Perceived information-sharing
failures prior to 9/11 led to a chorus of calls for breaking down
barriers both within and between agencies,270 and both Congress
and the executive branch have responded. The USA PATRIOT
Act’s removal of the so-called “wall,” which barred coordination
between law enforcement and intelligence officials, is perhaps the
most well-known, though by no means the only, post-9/11 change
along these lines.271 Regardless of the salutary impact that
separation of functions might have on civil liberties, the perceived
security value of consolidation means that neither Congress nor
the executive seems likely to reverse this trend.
Generating Information. More promising models of
reconciling conflicting priorities are focused on agency culture,
rather than agency structure. One mechanism for placing
pressure on agency culture and prompting decision makers to
consider factors that they otherwise might not give much weight
is a requirement that an agency generate certain types of
269. See Kirshner, supra note 266, at 232–33 (“To underscore its separation
from law enforcement, MI5 cannot make arrests or detentions.”).
270. See THE 9/11 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 159, at 416–19 (advocating for
a unified effort in information sharing across intelligence agencies); THE COMM’N
ON INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 429–50 (2005),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-WMD/pdf/GPO-WMD.pdf (proposing ways to
effectuate information sharing among intelligence agencies).
271. See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 218, 120
Stat. 192 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).

REGULATING DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

71

information. According to Professor Eric Biber, for example, “[a]
major goal of NEPA was to force agencies that formerly had
focused too heavily on primary missions such as highway
construction, water-project development, or the extraction of
natural resources, to also consider the impacts of their actions on
the environment.”272 To accomplish this goal, NEPA requires all
federal agencies proposing actions that will “significantly [affect]
the quality of the human environment” to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement and make copies available to
the public for written comments.273 These statements augment
the information available to agencies, including the possible
impacts on the environment, and proposals about how to avoid
adverse environmental effects.274 And commentators agree that
NEPA has been successful in integrating environmental goals
into agency decision making.275 Similarly, all agencies—including
the FBI—must generate a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for
“any substantially revised or new Information Technology
System”276 that collects, maintains, or disseminates personally
identifiable information from or about members of the public.277
And the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Civil Rights
and Civil Liberties generates Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Impact Assessments when required to do so by statute, when

272. Biber, supra note 239, at 35 (citing, inter alia, William L. Andreen, In
Pursuit of NEPA’s Promise: The Role of Executive Oversight in the
Implementation of Environmental Policy, 64 IND. L.J. 205, 205 (1989)).
273. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i) (2012).
274. See Joseph F.C. DiMento & Helen Ingram, Science and Environmental
Decision Making: The Potential Role of Environmental Impact Assessment in the
Pursuit of Appropriate Information, 45 NAT. RES. J. 283, 297–98 (2005)
(proclaiming the importance of NEPA’s environmental impact analysis
requirements to environmental law).
275. See Brian L. Cole et al., Prospects for Health Impact Assessment in the
United States: New and Improved Environmental Impact Assessment or
Something Different?, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1153, 1168 (2004) (“NEPA
was groundbreaking in that it forced agencies, regardless of their primary
mission, to consider the environmental repercussions of their actions . . . .”).
276. See The E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-307, § 208, 116
Stat. 2899, 2921 (requiring agencies to prepare privacy impact statements in
certain circumstances) (codified in scattered sections of 44 U.S.C.).
277. Id.
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they are requested by Department officials, or when the Officer
for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties believes it appropriate.278
Generating these assessments not only facilitates oversight
efforts from the public, the legislature, or internal watchdogs,
but—like requiring written justifications for changes—it has
other benefits as well. As an initial matter, it forces agency
decision makers to consciously consider the impact their proposed
policy will have.279 As one set of commentators put it, “a
systematic review of potential impacts during the planning
process can focus the attention of decision makers on issues that
they would otherwise deem to be outside their agency’s
mandate.”280 Requiring that effort will, at times, lead to agency
choices more solicitous of the issue on which the assessment is
focused. Decision-makers might simply need to be made aware of
the impact of their choices. In addition, they will recognize that
the substance of the assessment will be subject to scrutiny and,
perhaps, criticism that they would rather avoid. And by ensuring
that this information is before the decision makers while they are
engaged in the decision-making process—rather than after the
fact—makes the exercise all the more likely to have an impact.281
In addition, DHS’s Privacy Office Official Guidance on Privacy
Impact Assessments notes that the use of PIAs “demonstrates to
the public and to Congress” that the new systems “have
consciously incorporated privacy protections,” contributing to the
legitimacy of the systems.282
In order to ensure that the Attorney General or FBI Director
consider explicitly specific “secondary” goals, he or she should be
required to prepare a “Civil Liberties Impact Statement,”
278. Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Impact Assessments, DEP’T OF
HOMELAND
SECURITY,
http://www.dhs.gov/civil-rights-civil-liberties-impactassessments (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
279. See DiMento & Ingram, supra note 274, at 297–98 (arguing that EIAs
require “conscious deliberation about the environmental effects of a proposal”).
280. Cole et al., supra note 275, at 1176.
281. See id. (arguing that the EIA process works because it incorporates
relevant knowledge at the point of decision making).
282. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENTS: THE PRIVACY
OFFICE OFFICIAL GUIDANCE 1 (2010).
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articulating the likely effects of any proposed changes to the
Guidelines. Requiring the Attorney General to consider, and to
explain, whether the cost to civil liberties of any particular rule or
tactic outweighs its investigative benefits is sure to raise the
profile of civil liberties protection in the decision-making process.
And while these Statements will not include the detailed
scientific analysis that forms part of Environmental Impact
Statements, they will identify the potential civil liberties impacts
of proposed rules and force government officials both to note
those impacts, and to think about what steps can be taken to
mitigate them.
Inter-Agency
Lobbying.
A
final
mechanism
the
administrative state has used successfully to force agencies to
consider specific, under-emphasized perspectives is for the
political branches to enlist other agencies to police the primary
decision-making agency. This idea, too, has potential in the
Guidelines context. In some ways, this approach is simply a form
of expanding the scope of participation, including a “lobbying”
agency in the decision-making process to represent a particular
interest that the decision-making agency is required to
consider.283 In other words, for the lobbying agency, its primary
mission is to promote an interest that may be a “secondary” goal
to the decision-making agency. This approach can differ from
merely expanding participation in the process in that it envisions
a more active role for the lobbying agency than merely providing
a particular view to the decision maker. Again, a recommendation
already mentioned provides an example. Recall Professors
DeShazo and Freeman’s study about the licensing practices of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the impact of
Congress’s requirement that the Commission consult with fish
and wildlife agencies prior to issuing licenses.284 They concluded
that this requirement had a real impact on the Commission’s
treatment of the fish and wildlife agencies’ concerns.285
283. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 239, at 2222–29 (describing the
impact of “interagency lobbying” on FERC’s decision-making process); Biber,
supra note 239, at 44 (evaluating the “agency as lobbyist” model).
284. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 239–43 and accompanying text (discussing the study
and its results).
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Conferring a role in the decision-making process on an
agency whose priority is the protection of fundamental rights
might mitigate concerns that the FBI’s primary mission will
unnecessarily endanger civil liberties. The Attorney General
might, for example, be required to include officials from such an
agency in the process of devising the FBI’s investigative rules—to
give them a seat at the table. Just as including the Fish and
Wildlife Service in agency decision making ensures that decisions
take animal habitats into account, including an agency like the
PCLOB could play a similar role with civil liberties concerns in
the intelligence-collection context.286 Members and staff of the
board—many of whom, unlike staff at the Office of the Director
for National Intelligence (ODNI) or FBI charged with protecting
civil liberties offices, are drawn from the privacy and civil
liberties advocacy community287—could raise civil liberties
concerns that particular rules present, offer alternative means of
achieving the FBI’s desired ends, suggest procedural protections
that should accompany particular rules, or argue that certain
rules should not be approved at all. Most importantly, ensuring
an entity such as the PCLOB a seat at the table means that there
is a voice actively involved in the process whose primary concern
is not necessarily the prevention of terrorist acts.
While this type of interagency influence exertion can happen
informally,288 the regulatory or legislative creation of more
hierarchical forms of agency interaction to vindicate “secondary”
goals is likely more effective. Such a hierarchical structure causes
decision makers to regulate in the “shadow” of that lobbying
agency, prompting the decision-making agency “to internalize the

286. See GARRETT HATCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34385, PRIVACY AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD: NEW INDEPENDENT AGENCY STATUS 3 (2012)
(suggesting a role for the PCLOB in providing greater oversight for the
intelligence community).
287. See Schlanger, supra note 249, at 47–48 (arguing that for offices
dedicated to a particular value to be effective, they must be staffed by
individuals who identify themselves professionally as dedicated to that value,
rather than to the mission of the agency in which the office is embedded).
288. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 239, at 2261 (noting that agencies
might seek to influence each other to achieve a desired outcome through
“lobbying,” much like a private lobbyist).
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secondary mandates.”289 Consider the role of the OIRA, through
which the Executive Office of the President monitors
regulation.290 A presidential order places OIRA in a hierarchical
position over federal agencies to evaluate whether the benefits of
agencies’ proposed rules exceed their costs.291 And OIRA has the
power not just to make suggestions for modifications but actually
to block implementation of an agency regulation on this basis.292
This “veto” power requires those agencies to take into account
what they might consider a secondary goal—efficiency—when
contemplating regulatory action.293
As with the requirement that the Attorney General or FBI
Director consider input from particular entities, the impact and
effectiveness of this model would be highly contingent on the
degree to which Justice Department officials were obligated to
take the PCLOB’s opinions into account.294 An agency statutorily
empowered to overrule DOJ proposals would have enormous
practical effect. But such drastic (and implausible) measures are
not required. Again, there are a range of possible roles for the
PCLOB. For example, it could simply be given a seat at the table
during the formulation of the Guidelines, allowing its
representative to raise civil liberties concerns.295 Or a stronger
289. Id. at 2228.
290. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993)
(describing the role of the OIRA).
291. See id. (requiring transmission of a regulatory plan to OIRA for review).
But see Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1756–64 (2013) (arguing that agencies can effectively
insulate their decision making from presidential review).
292. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 239, at 2261 (explaining that third
parties may “alert Congress so that it can intervene to correct agency
misbehavior”).
293. See Biber, supra note 239, at 46–50 (explaining how OIRA developed
and its role in reviewing the costs of federal agency rules prior to distribution);
id. at 48 (“OMB monitors performance of agencies on a secondary goal—
maximizing economic efficiency in the achievement of other goals . . . —and
requires achievement of at least minimal performance on that goal before it
would approve the issuance of a rule.”).
294. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the role of reasoned decision making
through notice and comment requirements).
295. See Schlanger, supra note 249, at 32–33 (discussing how including
representatives of a particular point of view in working groups can influence
policy).
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thumb on the scale of civil liberties might be to require a report to
Congress about any instances in which the PCLOB and the
Attorney General or FBI Director are unable to reach agreement
on a particular issue.296
In sum, the procedural framework for the Guidelines should
explicitly require that the Attorney General or FBI Director take
into account the civil liberties costs when weighing policy options
by preparing a “Civil Liberties Impact Statement” detailing the
likely impact of the proposed changes on fundamental rights, and
should empower the PCLOB to play an active role in formulating
the Guidelines. These suggested procedures will not eliminate all
concerns about civil liberties raised by the Guidelines and the
DIOG. But in a context where preferred methods of rights
protection break down, they offer a second-best option.297
IV. Theoretical and Practical Objections
Even if one concedes the potential value of the above reform
suggestions, a couple of questions might arise. First, if the
answer to the governance gap in intelligence collection is to
import administrative law principles, why are existing proposals
in that vein insufficient? And second, in the absence of judicial
review and public scrutiny facilitated by transparency, how will
the procedural requirements suggested here be enforced? This
Part will address each of these questions in turn, arguing that
the reforms suggested above provide a better means of addressing
civil liberties concerns than existing reform proposals, and that
there are available mechanisms that can enforce compliance with
the recommended governance regime.

296. See id. at 33–35 (detailing how giving an agency clearance authority
and the power to conduct reviews are tools that can encourage cooperation with
another agency).
297. Cf. Katyal, supra note 172, at 2316 (arguing that when the “first-best
concept” of an executive checked by the legislature is unavailable, “checks and
balances must be updated to contemplate second-best executive v. executive
divisions”).
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A. Distinguishing Alternative Proposals
Recognizing the inadequacy of the current regime, some
scholars have suggested that terrorism be treated as an
administrative problem.298 This is a profound insight. After all,
the Justice Department and the FBI are agencies, and there is an
entire body of law whose raison d’être is to improve agency
governance regimes and ensure reasoned exercise of broad
delegations of power. But existing reform proposals do not
confront the Guidelines’ governance challenges that implicate
civil liberties concerns. Some call for the development of
mechanisms to improve our ability to assess the actual risk posed
by terrorism.299 Others argue that responses to terrorism should
take into account the unusually high psychological costs of
terrorism.300 Yet another approach looks for governance solutions
through the structure of congressional oversight of intelligence
operations.301
While some of these suggestions may prove beneficial to
counterterrorism efforts more generally, none offers solutions to
the civil liberties threats posed by the Guidelines and the DIOG.
Indeed, they are not focused on meeting those challenges. Rather,
they are concerned with broad-gauge adjustments to the
government’s general approach to counterterrorism. As a result,
they do not purport to offer means of channeling agency
discretion, enhancing the Guidelines’ democratic bona fides, or

298. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (listing scholars who advocate
taking a regulatory approach to the threat of terrorism).
299. See Stern & Wiener, supra note 6, at 396–97 (arguing that decision
makers developing counterterrorism measures “need mechanisms to ensure that
sensible risk analysis precedes precautionary actions”).
300. See Posner, supra note 6, at 690–97 (describing how public fear can
hinder government measures and recommending that agencies pay special
attention to the “psychology of fear”); Sunstein, supra note 6, at 131–33
(describing some of the problems a government may face in attempting to
address the panic that often results from terrorist attacks).
301. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence:
Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV.
1655, 1733–34 (2006) (describing a plan to reform congressional oversight of
intelligence operations).
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ensuring that concerns about fundamental rights are given the
attention they deserve.
One scholar does consider in detail what a regulatory
approach to intelligence collection might look like on the ground.
Professor Sam Rascoff advocates importing into the intelligencecollection context several of the traditional means of constraining
agency action, such as centralized cost−benefit review of agency
rules to ensure that rules are “rational”—which he defines as
efficient, effective, and sufficiently rights-respecting302—judicial
review,303 and increased public participation and transparency in
intelligence agency decision making.304 These mechanisms, he
asserts, will create a “risk-management approach to
counterterrorism” akin to other areas of regulatory endeavor.305
Rascoff predicts that this approach will increase the accuracy,
efficiency, and usefulness of the intelligence that is collected, and
it may in fact do so.306
In addition to yielding gains in the quality and efficiency of
intelligence collection, Rascoff expects his approach also to
promote the protection of rights and check abuse or illegality;307 it
is here where his proposal, in my view, falls short. In fact, when
it comes to addressing the civil liberties concerns inherent in the
Guidelines regime, his approach contains two flaws. First, it is
undertheorized. The traditional tools of administrative law—such
as cost−benefit analysis, judicial review, and public
302. See Rascoff, supra note 6, at 617–26 (arguing that centralized review
would both increase accuracy and cost-effectiveness of intelligence and protect
basic rights); Sunstein, supra note 6, at 131 (advocating cost−benefit analysis of
counterterrorism regulations).
303. See Rascoff, supra note 6, at 628–29 (discussing the benefits of judicial
review of agency action).
304. See id. at 629–33 (explaining that pluralism, and the related concept of
transparency, are beneficial because they provide credibility and additional
means through which oversight may occur).
305. Id. at 647.
306. See id. at 616 (“[R]egulatory governance implies a robust framework
that simultaneously aims to produce more accurate, [more] cost-effective, and
more rights-protecting intelligence.”).
307. See id. at 622–24 (arguing that empowering accountability mechanisms
provides the public with a better avenue for protecting rights and restraining
abuse).
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participation—simply cannot function effectively in the
intelligence-collection context. Their reliance on transparency,
public scrutiny of agency action, and judicial review renders them
largely inapplicable to intelligence collection.308 To be sure,
Rascoff recognizes the distinctiveness of the context and points to
ways to modify these tools to operate more effectively in the
intelligence-collection context. Judicial review, for example,
would be performed by the secret Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC), rather than traditional federal
courts;309 and cost−benefit analysis would be done by experts in
the ODNI rather than OIRA.310 But these adjustments do not go
far enough. Instead, the obstacles to regulating intelligence
collection require the formulation of new institutional designs
custom-tailored to meet the challenges that intelligence-collection
regulation presents. Second, and perhaps more importantly,
embedded in Rascoff’s proposal is an overly optimistic perspective
on the premise—a premise belied by history—that the
intelligence community can be relied upon to develop and enforce
civil liberties protections on itself.
Consider first the idea of centralized review of intelligence
policy in the ODNI to promote intelligence-collection rules that
are “rational”—efficient, effective, and sufficiently rights
respecting.311 Just as OIRA subjects agency regulations to
cost−benefit analysis, ODNI would review intelligence policies for
rationality.312 And because this rationality includes a mandate to
308. See Edward Levi, Attorney Att’y Gen. of the U.S., Address to the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York 1–2 (Apr. 28, 1975),
http://www.justice.gov/ag/aghistory/levi/1975/04-28-1975.pdf (discussing the
need for confidentiality in national security matters: “The need for
confidentiality is old, common to all governments, essential to ours since its
foundation”).
309. See Rascoff, supra note 6, at 586 (“[T]he FISC ought to provide the sort
of judicial review of agency action that I advocate . . . .”).
310. See id. (“The rationality review that I endorse should be performed by
an organization within the [ODNI], modeled on [OIRA] within [OMB].”).
311. See supra note 302 and accompanying text (defining and discussing
what is meant by the term “rational”).
312. See Rascoff, supra note 6, at 586 (explaining Rascoff’s recommended use
of the ODNI); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993)
(stating that an assessment of potential costs and benefits of regulatory action
shall be provided to OIRA).
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seek the appropriate balance between security and liberty, the
argument goes, it will ensure that privacy and liberty interests
are not ignored.313
Looking to ODNI review as a means of rationalizing
intelligence policy, however, is not a solution to civil liberties
concerns. Unlike regulatory action whose economic impact can be
measured, the liberty costs of various security policy options are
often either speculative or a matter of subjective valuation. How
would ODNI weigh the privacy harms caused by surveillance?
How many unnecessary additions to a terrorist watchlist are
justified by the detection of an incipient plot? Moreover, even if
such considerations could be quantified, ODNI will be unable to
know whether different, less intrusive, policies could produce the
same positive security result. Merely instructing ODNI to take
liberties costs into account may result in more liberty-solicitous
policy. But because these costs cannot be objectively evaluated
and intelligence community members are likely to assign lower
value to them than the population at large, cost−benefit review is
not a reliable mechanism for protecting individual rights.314
Moreover, ODNI itself is a member of the intelligence
community. It may be the case that ODNI “enjoys sufficient
distance from the various intelligence agencies” that it cannot be
co-opted by any one element of the intelligence community.315 But
ODNI need not be “captured” by the FBI to fall prey to the same
pro-security biases. ODNI’s website identifies its vision as, “A
Nation made more secure because of a fully integrated
Intelligence Community.”316 Indeed, the staff of ODNI itself, at
least initially, was drawn from other agencies within the

313. See Rascoff, supra note 6, at 625, 634–39 (arguing that rationality
review will ensure more effective intelligence collection and provide a secondary
benefit to liberty concerns).
314. See Daniel J. Mitchell, Fighting Terror and Defending Freedom: The
Role of Cost−Benefit Analysis, 25 PACE L. REV. 219, 220 (2005) (discussing the
difficulty of quantifying individual liberty and the benefits of cost−benefit
analysis in a free society).
315. Rascoff, supra note 6, at 637.
316. Mission, Vision & Goals, OFF. OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE,
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/mission (last visited Oct. 18, 2013)
(emphasis added) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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intelligence community.317 This vantage point inside the national
security apparatus means that ODNI’s assessment of the value of
proposed intelligence-collection policy and the costs of resulting
privacy and liberty sacrifices will not differ markedly from that of
the FBI itself. Because ODNI officials share the FBI’s primary
mission of ensuring security, it is unclear why they would value
civil liberties any differently than FBI officials or the Attorney
General.318 And because quantifying the value of civil liberties is
an inherently subjective exercise, moving responsibility for doing
so from one element of the intelligence community to another
seems unlikely to generate significant rights-protection
improvements.
Even if the ODNI is able to set aside its security hat for the
purpose of evaluating the civil liberties implications of particular
policies, it will receive a distorted view of the policies in question.
ODNI will not have the benefit of information provided by
stakeholders outside the intelligence community. Intelligence
community
officials
are
likely—either
consciously
or
unconsciously—to overvalue their own role and to present
information in ways that support the intelligence-collection
policies they favor. Without subjecting such information to
scrutiny outside the intelligence community or considering
outside views, any relevant flaws or biases in the information
presented to the ODNI will remain uncontested. So while
centralized review would impose an additional layer of
bureaucratic scrutiny of the Guidelines, the additional review
would not replicate the benefits that centralized review has
produced in other parts of the administrative state, at least when
it comes to civil liberties, because the ODNI cannot offer a
neutral, dispassionate evaluation of the benefits and drawbacks
of intelligence-collection policy.
317. See GARRETT M. GRAFF, THE THREAT MATRIX 19 (2011) (describing the
ODNI as “staffed with some of the top minds from the FBI, the CIA, Homeland
Security, and the Pentagon”); Rascoff, supra note 6, at 637 (noting that the
ODNI “possesses the core competences” to discharge its role effectively).
318. See Quick Facts, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/
about-us/quick-facts (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (“[T]he mission of the FBI is to
protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence
threats . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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The suggestion that the FISC approximate the role of
traditional judicial review of agency decision making to impose
constraints on discretion will also fail to result in the
preservation of civil liberties. As an initial matter, it is unclear
what the extent of the FISC’s review might be. Traditional
judicial review of administrative rules asks whether an agency’s
action is consistent with the Constitution and its statutory
mandate or whether it is arbitrary or capricious.319 But when it
comes to most intelligence-collection rules, there is no
constitutional or statutory standard against which a court could
measure agency compliance.320 One proposed solution to this
baseline problem is to have the FISC review policy for whether it
is consistent with the intelligence agencies’ own stated
objectives.321 Again, this proposal fails to account for the fact that
when the intelligence community is left to determine the rules of
its own conduct, concerns other than security will get short shrift.
By asking intelligence agencies to identify their own objectives
and then subjecting their efforts to meet those objectives to
judicial review would replicate the current situation—where the
constraints on agencies are limited to those that they agree to
place on themselves—but with the added legitimating feature of
judicial imprimatur.
Another barrier to enlisting the FISC in intelligencecollection governance is that the intelligence-collection activities
governed by the Guidelines extend beyond the scope of the FISC’s
jurisdiction. The FISC oversees electronic foreign intelligence
surveillance and physical searches of premises connected with
foreign powers.322 It has no role in overseeing purely domestic
319. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(e) (2012) (detailing the scope of review for a
reviewing court).
320. See Rascoff, supra note 6, at 591 (discussing the types of legal rules
that apply to intelligence collection and noting the lack of governance for the
conduct of human intelligence collection).
321. See id at 628 (proposing that at some regular interval a court should
“review the agency’s program for fidelity to the agency’s own stated (and
previously approved) objectives”); cf. Bressman, supra note 190, at 529–33
(arguing that agency articulations of the limits on their own power would
address concerns about excessive delegations of discretion).
322. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1829 (2012) (defining the scope of legal foreign
intelligence searches and surveillance).
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surveillance of Americans absent probable cause that those
Americans are agents of a foreign power.323 The content of the
Guidelines and the activities they regulate—such as physical
surveillance of Americans, infiltration of religious or political
groups, the use of informants, requests for internet history—
rarely fall within the FISC’s jurisdiction. Individuals who wish to
challenge FBI activity—if they can establish standing—do not
have access to the FISC.324 Thus, it is unclear what role the FISC
could play in reviewing many activities in which the FBI engages.
The FISC, too, is likely to share the FBI and ODNI’s bias
toward the security mission. Unless a recipient of a FISC order
challenges the legitimacy of that order, proceedings in the FISC
are not subject to an adversarial process.325 Instead, like
magistrate judges considering whether to issue traditional search
warrants, FISC judges review unopposed government
applications for surveillance orders.326 The FISC thus receives
323. See id. § 1801(b) (defining the term “agent of a foreign power”).
324. See id. § 1806(e)–(h) (discussing the means by which a person may
challenge the use of electronic surveillance in a trial or hearing).
325. See Rascoff, supra note 6, at 642–44 (explaining that judicial review
before the FISC and traditional judicial review differ because FISC review lacks
a meaningful adversarial process). Third parties generally lack “incentives . . .
to challenge government requests for information.” Id. at 644.
326. See id. at 639 (discussing the application process for surveillance to the
FISC); 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (detailing the requirements of an application for court
order to the FISC). In the wake of the NSA surveillance revelations in 2013,
some proposals have emerged to inject an adversarial element into FISC
proceedings. See, e.g., Matt Sledge, Adam Schiff Prepares FISA Court Bill To
Create Special Privacy Advocate, HUFFINGTON POST (July 25, 2013, 3:42 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/25/adam-schiff-fisa-court_n_3653946.ht
ml (last visited Oct. 19, 2013) (describing one Congressman’s plans to introduce
legislation creating a special privacy advocate who would appear before the
FISC to represent the public interest) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); James G. Carr, A Better Secret Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/opinion/a-better-secret-court.html
(last
visited Oct. 19, 2013) (advocating that FISC judges appoint a lawyer to
represent the public interest when novel questions come before it) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). The likely success of such proposals is
uncertain; United Kingdom and Canadian efforts in this vein have been roundly
criticized. See JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: 28 DAYS, INTERCEPT AND POST-CHARGE QUESTIONING, 2006–2007,
H.L. 157, H.C. 394, at 49–55 (U.K.) (describing the functions of and concerns
with the use of Special Advocates to represent the interest of excluded parties in
closed hearings).
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only the Justice Department’s perspective—heavily informed by
the FBI’s perspective—about any given rule. This concern is
compounded by the fact that even the judges themselves largely
hail from the law enforcement community—twelve of the fourteen
judges who have served this year are former prosecutors and one
is a former state police director.327 Moreover, once selected by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for FISC service, these judges
are exposed to a constant stream of government applications to
engage in foreign intelligence collection detailing just how
dangerous the world can be and the important role that
intelligence collection plays in combating those dangers.328 FISC
involvement thus serves only to reinforce the pro-security
perspective already embedded in the development of domesticintelligence-collection policies.
Finally, Justice Department briefings to congressional
committees and to interested nongovernmental organizations
shortly before the current Guidelines were officially issued can be
interpreted as evidence of “the possible emergence in the
domestic intelligence arena of a new ethic of interest group
representation.”329 This form of participation, however, left many
interested parties unsatisfied330 and bore only “a passing
resemblance” to traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking.331
These meetings permitted stakeholders to see (but not to copy or
retain) a near-final draft of the document weeks before its
implementation. But the Guidelines were entirely subject to the
327. John Shiffman & Kristina Cooke, The Judges Who Preside Over
America’s Secret Court (June 21, 2013 1:11 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/06/21/us-usa-security-fisa-judges-idUSBRE95K06H20130621 (last
visited Oct. 19, 2013) (describing the professional background of the FISC
judges) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
328. See Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
Gen., to the Honorable Harry Reid, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (Apr. 30,
2013), http://www.justice.gov/nsd/foia/foia_library/2012fisa-ltr.pdf (reporting on
the 1,856 applications made to the FISC in 2012).
329. Rascoff, supra note 6, at 644–66.
330. See id. at 646 (quoting Senator Russ Feingold asking FBI Director
Robert Mueller: “Why can’t you at least solicit . . . suggestions in a meaningful
process that involves more than a single meeting where the participants aren’t
even allowed . . . to keep a copy [of the draft guidelines]?”).
331. Id. at 645.
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Attorney General’s discretion with respect to whether to respond
to or to take any views expressed at these meetings into
consideration. This superficial involvement of interested parties
does not provide sufficiently broad, meaningful participation
outside the Justice Department and the FBI to alleviate the
accountability and democracy deficit with the Guidelines and
DIOG.
B. Oversight of Procedural Requirements
One possible objection to this Article’s proposals is that, in
eschewing judicial review and conceding the secret nature of the
Guidelines regime, they relinquish all means of enforcing their
requirements. As with the proposed procedural rules themselves,
however, the principles behind the administrative state’s
compliance mechanisms offer a (partial) solution.332
Notice-and-comment rulemaking employs the transparency
of the rulemaking process followed by public and judicial review
to enforce the regulatory regime to which agency decision making
is subjected.333 The public’s role in that regime is to play
watchdog. Because rulemaking and its results are conducted in a
transparent fashion, interested stakeholders can be relied upon
to object if they believe that an agency has not acted
appropriately.334 The public will scrutinize not only proposed
rules to ensure that they do not suffer from procedural, logical, or
evidentiary deficiencies, but also any information that is made
public as part of the process. If, for example, an Environmental
Impact Statement predicts dire environmental consequences from
a proposed agency action, environmental activists will use that
332. See supra Part III.D.2 (explaining how the procedural rule changes
discussed offer a second-best option).
333. See Aftergood, supra note 234, at 399 (“[T]he free flow of information to
interested members of the public is a prerequisite to their participation in the
deliberative process and to their ability to hold elected officials accountable.”).
334. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking,
47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 59 (1995) (naming a number of benefits that informal
rulemaking confers on society, including the fact that “rulemaking enhances
fairness by allowing all potentially affected members of the public to participate
in the decision-making process”).
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Statement to lobby not only the agency but also Congress and the
President to prevent the agency from taking the proposed
action.335 Another important compliance-related element of public
scrutiny is the fact that it can lead to legal challenges to agency
rules. If a regulated entity believes that a regulation applied to it
was adopted through flawed procedures, it can bring suit, thereby
subjecting the regulation to judicial review.336 Through this
review, courts serve to confirm that agency decisions are not
unjustified exercises of discretion and that they followed the
mandated procedures.337 Consequently, courts engage in a
“searching and careful” review of the record an agency makes of
its decision-making process338 and will invalidate the results of
proceedings that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law.”339 These standards are
not necessarily particularly stringent, but like public scrutiny,
335. See, e.g., Sierra Club Continues the Fight Against the Keystone XL Tar
Sands Pipeline: Case Updates, SIERRA CLUB, http://www.sierraclub.org/environ
mentallaw/lawsuits/0476.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (detailing the Sierra
Club’s lobbying efforts against the Keystone XL Tar Sands Pipeline) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
336. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743–44 (1985) (“The
task of the reviewing court is to apply the appropriate APA standard of review
to the agency decision based on the record the agency presents to the reviewing
court.”).
337. See Sunstein, supra note 192, at 63 (“A principal concern is that
without the procedural and substantive requirements of [judicial review], the
governing values may be subverted . . . .”); id. at 68 (“[P]rocedural rights are
created because of a perception that the existing processes of representation are
an inadequate guaranty that the outcome will be something other than the
result of private whim.”).
338. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419
(1971) (noting that an agency must consider the “whole record” in making a
rule, and courts are entitled to review the full administrative record to evaluate
the challenged action).
339. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); see also Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n. of the
U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (noting that
courts will reject reasoning “so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise”); Overton Park, 401 U.S. at
416 (explaining that agency decisions reflecting a “clear error of judgment” are
unacceptable). Agency decisions are also struck down because the agency “relied
on factors” that Congress did not authorize, State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43; the
agency failed to consider “relevant factors,” Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416; or
the agency failed to “consider obvious alternatives,” City of Brookings Mun. Tel.
Co. v. F.C.C., 822 F.2d 1153, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

REGULATING DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

87

they do ensure that agency decisions have been reached through
the proper procedures and therefore that they are reasoned
rather than arbitrary or irrational.
Perhaps just as importantly, the roles that the public and the
courts play impose an important “prior restraint” on agencies.
Knowing that their rules and the justifications that they offer for
them will be public and potentially subject to judicial scrutiny,
agencies will be more likely to be conscientious, hoping to ensure
that their decision-making processes pass judicial muster.340 In
other words, they will take any procedural requirements
seriously from the outset knowing that, if they do not, any
resulting rule could ultimately be invalidated.
Fashioning equally effective means of supervising Justice
Department or FBI compliance with any relevant rules is a
challenge, because the transparency that facilities both public
scrutiny and judicial review is concededly difficult to replicate.
Any proceedings regarding the Guidelines that take place outside
of public view are shielded from the public-as-watchdog. If the
relevant rules were legislatively mandated, challenges to any
failure to abide by them theoretically could be reviewed by the
courts.341 But even in the unlikely event that Congress imposes
procedural requirements akin to those suggested here, such suits
will fall prey to the same barriers that currently exist to
challenging the FBI’s intelligence-collection activities—any
individual or entity seeking to challenge the Guidelines or the
DIOG on the grounds that they did not follow the required
procedures would struggle to establish standing and to overcome
the state secrets privilege.342
As with the reforms suggested to channel the Justice
Department’s discretion and to improve the participatory nature
of the Guidelines’ development process, ensuring compliance with
procedural requirements would necessitate a means of
approximating the traditionally public and judicial roles. One
340. See Pierce, supra note 334, at 68 (noting that judicial review can be
beneficial to the extent that “it induces agencies to consider issues and values
agencies otherwise would be tempted to ignore”).
341. See supra note 337–39 and accompanying text (discussing the standard
of review imposed on agency actions by the APA).
342. See supra Part II.B.2.
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option in this regard would be to enlist proxies within the
executive branch to engage in scrutiny of the decision-making
process, to inquire whether the process complied with any
required procedures, and to consider whether the required
statement(s) of justification are adequate. A government
watchdog could be assigned to take the place of the public and
judicial watchdogs that normally play this role.343 The Justice
Department’s Inspector General (IG)—who is statutorily
empowered to conduct audits, investigations, inspections, and
reviews of Justice Department programs and to issue reports to
Congress regarding the results of any investigations that it does
conduct—might play a constructive role in holding the Attorney
General and FBI Director accountable for following any
applicable procedural rules. The IG investigates not only alleged
violations of the law by DOJ employees, but also audits and
inspects DOJ programs regularly.344 That office could perform
reviews of the process employed each time the Guidelines or the
DIOG are amended. Audits conducted by the IG would be
especially effective in replicating the effects of traditional
transparency if the results of those audits could be released
publicly. Indeed, IGs have, at times, played quite important roles
in uncovering violations of law and policy in pursuit of security.345
Perhaps more than any other oversight mechanism (with the
exception of unlawful leaks of classified information), audit
reports from the Justice Department’s Inspector General have
shed light on the FBI’s investigative activities in the wake of
9/11. These reports, some of which revealed violations of law or

343. See supra note 334 and accompanying text (describing the role of the
citizen as “watchdog” over agency actions).
344. See About the Office, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST.,http://www.justice.gov/oig/about/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2013) (detailing the
structure and duties of the Inspector General’s office) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
345. See Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within, supra note 7, at 1047–48
(discussing the Inspector General’s review of coercive interrogation techniques
used by the CIA). But see id. at 1048–49 (pointing out risks to InspectorsGeneral independence given their location within an agency and noting that
agencies are often reluctant to provide full information to an Inspector General
conducting investigations).
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policy, drew both public and congressional attention, and
consequently prompted changes to internal FBI policy.346
To be sure, even publicly released IG conclusions would lack
some of the other compliance-enhancing characteristics of public
and judicial scrutiny. The IG does not have the power to
invalidate rules that are adopted through flawed procedures or
lack sufficient justification. It can point out flaws and
insufficiencies, but ultimately any findings or recommendations
would be nonbinding. This absence of compulsory power sacrifices
some of the sword-of-Damocles threat inherent in the promise of
judicial review. If, however, the findings and recommendations
can be made public, the threat of reputational costs to the FBI
still imposes some ex ante incentive to comply with required
procedures. And IGs have been particularly successful in
generating public reports for reviews of even the most sensitive
programs.347
An alternative, though less promising, option would be to
rely upon Congress to monitor compliance through either the
General Accounting Office, which regularly audits and reviews
agency programs on behalf of Congress, or the congressional
oversight committees themselves. This option is less promising
than the IG, however, because Congress already has the power to
insist on these types of procedures but has chosen not to
intervene when it comes to the Guidelines and the DIOG. Indeed,
346.

See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., A REVIEW
FBI’S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS 124 (2007) (discussing the
Inspector General’s findings with regard to the FBI’s improper use of national
security letters); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., A REVIEW
OF THE FBI’S USE OF NSLS: ASSESSMENT OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND
EXAMINATION OF NSL USAGE IN 2006, 8–12 (2008) (detailing the FBI’s efforts to
reduce the improper use of NSLs and noting further measures to ensure
elimination of the NSL problems identified); see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S USE OF EXIGENT LETTERS AND
OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTS FOR TELEPHONE RECORDS 64–78 (2010) (detailing
several additional FBI practices that were found to be inappropriate and
improper).
347. See, e.g., OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN. OF THE DEP’T OF DEF., DEP’T OF
JUST., CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF
NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAM (2009) (detailing a review of the President’s classified terrorist
surveillance program to detect and prevent further attacks on the United States
organized after Sept. 11, 2001).
OF THE
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in 2008, several members of the Senate Judiciary Committee
voiced concerns about imminent changes in the Guidelines.348 The
Attorney General was under no obligation to take those concerns
into account, however, and he did not respond to the Senators’
correspondence.349
V. Conclusion
Domestic intelligence collection presents a challenge in a
democracy. While it can play a crucial role in keeping our nation
secure, it also poses threats to the very freedoms that make that
nation worth defending. When the prevention of terrorism is
viewed as a regulatory problem—one to be managed rather than
defeated—the challenge becomes more manageable. Examining
regulatory strategies developed over the past half-century in the
administrative state provides a roadmap for the development of
structural and procedural mechanisms to channel executive
discretion into reasoned, evidence-based decisions; to include
viewpoints from outside the intelligence community in the
process; and to ensure that the Justice Department explicitly
takes into account the civil liberties perspective.350 The need to
substitute alternative mechanisms for tools that are often
effective in governing agency action, such as judicial review and
public scrutiny, means that they may be less directly effective in
achieving their goals.351 But developing such a framework is a
348. See Letter from Patrick Leahy, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, Russell D. Feingold, U.S. Senator, Edward M. Kennedy, U.S.
Senator, Richard J. Durbin, U.S. Senator, to The Honorable Michael Mukasey,
Attorney Gen. (Nov. 25, 2008), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/resources/docu
ments/upload/110thCongress-2008Documents.pdf (notifying the Attorney
General of substantial concerns about the new Guidelines).
349. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, 533, 534 (2012) (outlining the role of the
Attorney General and the foundation for the Attorney General’s power to craft
the Guidelines); Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981)
(detailing the goals and certain requirements of United States intelligence
activity).
350. See supra Part III (discussing the framework for governance of the
administrative state and proposing a governance framework for the rules
governing FBI’s intelligence collection programs).
351. See supra Part IV (noting that traditional tools for agency governance
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viable second-best option in a context where the traditional
means of government oversight break down.352 It will contribute
to generating the appropriate FBI for the twenty-first century,
one that takes into account not only the nature of the disease, but
also the potential costs of the cure.

are not available in the intelligence-collection context and alternative tools may
need to be substituted).
352. See supra Part IV.

